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Abstract
The primary motivations for the formation of airline alliances have been to increase
revenues and decrease costs for alliance partners. A major advantage comes through
increase in the number of destinations served by an airline at little costs, by using
codesharing. Airlines share seat inventory on each other's codeshare flights which
complicates their revenue management practice and leads to sub optimal revenue gains.
This thesis analyzes the challenges related to alliance revenue management in practice
and proposes innovative and feasible solutions to increase revenues for the combined
alliance.
The four key dimensions of the alliance revenue management problem are analyzed:
recording & forecasting, seat allocation method or optimizer, codeshare valuation in the
optimizer and availability control of codeshare bookings. The performance of different
techniques is quantified using the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS). It is
found that sharing of information between partners to different degrees can be used to
improve revenues. A new valuation scheme called dynamic valuation is developed in an
effort to increase the combined alliance revenues by using bid price sharing, a method of
sharing information related to codeshare legs.
Dynamic valuation leads to additional revenue gains in the range of 0.30% to 0.50% over
other techniques. This can translate into an incremental revenue gain, up to $ 100 M per
year, for larger airlines in alliance partnerships. Dynamic valuation also provides a basis
for further development of models related to revenue sharing proportions of alliance
partners. The challenges and risks involved in implementing dynamic valuation are
discussed.
Thesis Supervisor: Peter Paul Belobaba
Title: Principal Research Scientist of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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1. Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Airline Alliances
An airline alliance is defined as "any kind of agreement between independent carriers to
mutually benefit from the coordination of certain activities in the provision of air
transportation services" (De la Torre, 1999).
These activities may include the following, in the order of increasing commitment:
oo Codesharing (this activity is described in detail in section 1.3)
oo Scheduling of flight arrival and departure gates
co Location of arrival and departure gates
oo Joint frequent flyer programs
oo Share of airport lounges and other ground facilities
oo Share of passenger services like baggage handling and check-in
oo Share of support services like maintenance and catering
oo Share of distribution and retailing functions
oo Joint purchasing of such items as fuel, passenger service goods and aircrafts
oo Joint advertising campaigns and creation of a common brand
oo Joint allocation of resources (fleet and crew planning)
oo Equity investment in partner's stock
Airline alliances are different than mergers because the carriers still remain independent
and operate individually in alliances. The degree of commitment in an alliance can be
customized depending on mutual agreement between the partners. Joint venture is
another vehicle of partnership which involves a higher degree of commitment from
partners and a legal arrangement to create a new business entity, whose ownership is
shared by the partners.
The motivations behind the formation of airline alliances and their advantages and
disadvantages are discussed in Chapter 2 in the literature review.
Both passenger and cargo alliances exist between carriers to coordinate activities in
respective areas. This thesis deals with passenger alliances only. The current three major
passenger alliances are: Star Alliance, Sky Team and One World. Some key facts and
figures about these alliances, for the year 2010, are provided in Table 1.1.
A IW
STAR ALLIANCE
Member Airlines 27 13 14
Revenue Passenger 1205.1 B 755.1 B 725.1 B
Kilometers
Daily Departures 21000 12597 9381
Table 1.1: Facts and Figures for Three Major Passenger Alliances, 2010
1.2 Traffic Components in Airline Alliances
In the context of airline alliances, the total traffic carried by an alliance partner can be
categorized into three components which will be explained here with the help of the
example shown in Figure 1.1.
FRA
LAX W) ORD
LGA
Figure 1.1: Traffic Components Example
1. Local Traffic: It consists of passengers who travel on a single flight leg to
complete their itinerary i.e. whose origin-destination pair is the same as the city
pair of the flight leg. For example: passengers traveling between LAX-ORD,
ORD-LGA and ORD-FRA in Figure 1.1. Local passengers can be booked only by
the airline operating the given flight leg.
2. Connecting Traffic: Passengers traveling on multiple flight legs operated by the
same airline in order to complete their itinerary constitute the connecting traffic.
For example: LAX-LGA passengers in Figure 1.1 who connect in ORD. Both
LAX-ORD and ORD-LGA are operated by the same airline. Similar to the local
passengers, connecting passengers can be booked only by the airline operating the
connecting flight legs.
3. Codeshare Traffic: Passengers traveling on multiple flight legs all of which are not
operated by a single airline, form the codeshare traffic (except in virtual
codesharing, refer section 1.3). For example: LAX-FRA passengers in Figure 1.1
where LAX-ORD flight leg is operated by partner 1 in the alliance while ORD-
FRA leg is operated by partner 2 in the alliance. Unlike local and connecting
itineraries, codeshare itineraries can be booked by any partner operating at least
one of the flight legs in the itinerary.
Similar to the traffic components, all the itineraries offered by an airline can be divided
into three types: local paths, connecting paths and codeshare paths. Paths are flights and
combinations of flights that will take a traveler from origin to destination.
1.3 Concept of Codesharing
The U.S. Department of Transportation defines codesharing arrangement as "an
arrangement in which a carrier's designator code is used to identify a fight operated by
another carrier" (Lehman Jr., 2010). It reflects a marketing arrangement allowing an
airline to sell seats -in its own name- on a flight operated by another airline. For
example: a flight from Boston to Frankfurt operated by Lufthansa Airlines under the
flight number LH 342 can be marketed by United Airlines under the flight number
UA* 7683, with the asterisk indicating that this flight is a codeshare flight operated by a
different airline. For such a codeshare flight Lufthansa Airlines is called as the operating
carrier while United Airlines is called as the marketing carrier.
Codesharing is one of the most common activities coordinated between alliance partners.
Codesharing began in 1967 (Lehman Jr., 2010) when the first codesharing agreement
was signed between Henson Aviation, a regional carrier, and Allegheny Airlines to serve
Hagerstown, MD and Washington National Airport (DCA). Codesharing expanded
greatly after deregulation when larger carriers expanded hub and spoke operations.
Larger carriers started forming relationships with smaller carriers, usually commuter
carriers through codeshare agreements to feed their hubs. Codesharing also quickly
expanded to international markets. The first international codesharing agreement was
signed between in 1985 American Airlines and Qantas (Darot, 2001), which gave the
American carrier access to the Australian market.
Codesharing agreements can be customized based on the objectives of the airlines
involved. A variety of codesharing agreements can be found in the industry and the key
types are explained here.
1. Parallel codesharing: Codesharing between two partners on a route which is
operated by both of them is called as parallel codesharing. This is the case with
the codeshare flights operated between hubs of two airlines. Parallel codesharing
may prove to be disadvantageous to customers because of the possible reduction
in combined frequency and rise in fares on that route.
2. Complementary Codesharing: When partners use each other's flights to provide
connecting service to markets which are out of their own network, it is known as
complementary codesharing. Complementary codesharing is instrumental in
increasing the number of destinations served by an airline. It helps in extending
the service to many international destinations without incurring huge incremental
costs.
3. Virtual Codesharing: Unlike other codesharing agreements, virtual codesharing
consists of flight leg(s) which is/are operated by a single carrier (Ito and Lee,
2007). The itinerary can still be marketed by a partner of the operating carrier in
the alliance. Virtual codesharing is common in domestic alliances only. This thesis
excludes virtual codesharing from simulation experiments.
4. Point-specific Codesharing: These agreements require little commitment from
alliance partners and can be customized to fit the specific needs of partners on
several markets. They often involve one airline's purchasing blocks of seats on
another airline's flights and then reselling them, referred to as a block space
arrangement.
5. Strategic Codesharing: These agreements involve codesharing between airlines on
a vast number of routes so as to strategically link both airlines' networks. Here
the seats are accessed between the partners using free sale agreement (De la
Torre, 1999) which is aimed to provide a seamless availability.
1.4 Motivation and Goal of the Thesis
The motivation for undertaking this research originates from the increasing importance
of alliances to the airlines around the world and the consequent challenges they face on
the revenue management front. Airline alliances have grown rapidly in the last decade
and have become central to the business strategy at many of the larger carriers in the
world. The three major passenger alliances: Star Alliance, Sky Team and One World
constituted more than half of the capacity and traffic in the year 2010. Figure 1.1 shows
the global market shares of airline alliances in terms of Revenue Passenger Kilometers
(RPK).
O Star Alliance
E SkyTeam
41.10% 2 oneworld
0 Others
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Revenue Passenger Kilometers (RPK), 2010
The revenue gains from alliances can become sub-optimal and potentially negative
network effects can be produced due to improper revenue management. Partner airlines
in an alliance carry an additional type of traffic, besides local and connecting passengers,
called codeshare passengers as explained in section 1.2. The codeshare traffic creates new
challenges for airline revenue management systems (De la Torre, 1999), which now have
the added complexity of dealing with itineraries which partially lie outside an airline's
network. It creates sub-optimality in the system and affects the local and connecting
passengers as well because of network effects.
Researchers from the field of Operations Research (OR) have tried to solve the problem
of revenue management for airline alliances in past and have proposed advanced models
to find optimal solutions to the problem. However, they make unrealistic assumptions in
the areas of demand forecasting, network effects, competition effects, and availability of
partner's information. It should be recognized that the alliance partners and their
revenue management systems remain independent in an alliance and have to deal with
network and competition. This creates many complexities for the airline revenue
management systems in the real world which are usually ignored by the OR models.
The goal of this thesis is to first identify the challenges and critical issues involved in
revenue management for airline alliances and then propose innovative and feasible
solutions to increase revenue gains for the combined alliance. The performance of current
techniques used by airlines, those proposed in the literature, and newly developed
techniques is quantified using a software simulator tool called Passenger Origin-
Destination Simulator (PODS).
1.5 Thesis Overview
This first chapter provides a brief overview of the thesis topic, motivation of the thesis
and its goal. The second chapter presents a review of the existing literature on airline
alliances. It covers literature related to motivation for formation of alliances, their
economic impacts, revenue sharing and revenue management for airlines alliances. It
emphasizes the importance of optimizing the combined alliance revenues and underscores
the need for a comprehensive study of the practical steps involved in alliance revenue
management.
The third chapter describes the implementation details of revenue management system
components in the context of alliances. It presents the challenges faced by airline
alliances in the real world through four key dimensions of recording & forecasting, seat
allocation method, codeshare valuation and availability control. Each dimension is
explained in detail providing relevant examples. Various techniques, which are currently
being practiced in the industry or are proposed in the literature, are also discussed under
each of the four dimensions.
The fourth chapter presents simulation results which are obtained using PODS. The first
section of this chapter provides a brief overview of PODS and its different components.
The next section provides details of the simulation environment. It lays out the network
structure which is used for simulations and presents a baseline case for the purpose of
comparisons. The remaining sections present findings from numerous experiments related
to the different dimensions of alliance revenue management.
The fifth chapter introduces a new valuation scheme for codeshare paths called dynamic
valuation. The first section describes its formulation while the successive sections discuss
the PODS simulation results of its implementation. A detailed and comparative analysis
is made with the static valuation schemes as well as with the techniques of bid price
sharing control, which are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
Finally, the sixth chapter summarizes the findings of this thesis, draws conclusions from
them and proposes future research directions.

2. Chapter 2
Literature Review
Revenue management is the practice of maximizing revenues obtained through the sale of
given products having an uncertain demand. In the case of airlines, the products are
seats on flights which are fixed in number and perishable. Literature on airline revenue
management dates back to 1970s and the field has seen tremendous progress since late
1980s. The first section of this chapter provides a brief overview of the existing literature
on airline revenue management. An extensive overview is covered in several papers, for
example, McGill and van Ryzin (1999) and Barnhart, Belobaba and Odoni (2003). The
remaining sections focus on the existing literature on airline alliances. Two
comprehensive resources in this area are De la Torre's thesis (De la Torre, 1999) and
Darot's thesis (Darot, 2001), from which some of the material in this chapter is drawn.
2.1 Airline Revenue Management: Key
Components
The two key components of airline revenue management systems are overbooking and
seat inventory control. The latter can be further divided into controlling the mix of
passengers by fare class and by origin-destination (O-D). Let us understand these
components briefly by taking an example. A flight from Boston to Frankfurt with 200
physical seats on the plane is overbooked if the operating carrier accepts more than 200
bookings. Thus overbooking is the practice of selling more seats than available capacity.
It allows airlines to prevent any revenue loss due to passengers who do not show up on
the day of departure paying little or no penalty and resulting in empty seats. On the
other hand, if more people show up than the total number of available seats, then airlines
have to deal with costs of denied boardings. There is a rich amount of literature on the
overbooking problem and models to estimate the level of overbooking. Some models are
based on statistical formulations as developed by Thompson (1961), Taylor (1962),
Rothstein and Stone (1967), Martinez and Sanchez (1970) and Littlewood (1972).
Alstrup et al. (1986) describes dynamic programming framework where cancellations and
reservations in subsequent time periods are taken into account.
The second key component of airline revenue management- seat inventory control
consists of fare class control and O-D control. Let us first broadly understand their
meanings with the help of our example from the above paragraph. The Boston -
Frankfurt flight would carry passengers who booked at many different fares, from low to
high depending on the time of booking and associated restrictions like cancellation fees or
lack of them. Fare class control essentially refers to limiting the number of seats sold at
discount (low) fares and protecting the seats for higher fare classes. Now this flight can
carry passengers traveling between many different origin-destination (O-D) markets. Not
only BOS-FRA, but also passengers connecting in Frankfurt to further destinations, like
BOS-BOM, BOS-HKG, etc. may also travel on this flight. O-D control refers to the
ability of distinguishing between the bookings requests pertaining to different O-D
markets and estimating a measure called network value to compare all itineraries under
same criteria.
The seat inventory control is handled using various detruncation, forecasting and seat
allocation tools. The first step in the process is to collect the historical observations.
These observations are stored either by leg/class or path/class depending on the type of
seat allocation method which eventually uses the demand forecast estimated from these
observations. Detruncation is then applied to unconstrain those historical observations
where true demand is not observed due to booking or capacity limits. The next step is
forecasting of future demand. Two principal approaches used for forecasting are time
series and regression. Skwarek (1996) and Zickus (1998) provide a detailed analysis of
various detruncation and forecasting methods. The demand forecast is fed as an input to
the seat allocation method along with the specified fare levels. Leg based control and 0-
D control are two most common approaches used in the industry for seat allocation.
Belobaba (1989), McGill (1989), Curry (1990), Wollmer (1992), Brumelle and McGill
(1993), and van Ryzin and McGill (1998) discuss the methods for leg based control. O-D
control methods are explained by Smith and Penn (1988), Vinod (1989), Curry (1990),
Williamson (1992), and Bratu (1998). Seat allocation methods have a large influence on
alliance revenue management and Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the leg
based control and O-D control methods.
The topic of alliances is one of the most closely watched topics in the airline industry
since 1990s. Several theoretical and analytical studies have been completed focusing on
their motivation, evolution, economics, revenue management and sharing, and impacts on
fares and customer welfare. However, research in the analytical space has remained
sparse. The following sections discuss the existing literature which covers one or more of
these aspects of airline alliances.
2.2 Motivation for Airline Alliances
After the expansion of hub and spoke networks post deregulation, the airlines soon
realized the advantages of expanding those globally to form intercontinental networks.
However, due to regulatory and other constraints the global expansions and mergers were
infeasible and airlines thus started forming strategic alliances with foreign carriers.
Strategic alliances' partners participate extensively in coordinated activities and show
greater degree of commitment in order to achieve common goals. The coordinated
activities included codesharing, coordinated flight scheduling, and joint marketing
campaigns to create common brand recognition.
Agusdinata and de Klein (2002) provide a thorough explanation of driving forces behind
the formation of airline alliances using a system dynamics approach. De la Torre (1999)
quotes alliances as "strategic weapons" because of their competitive advantages (Figure
2.1). He provides empirical evidences of the various economic benefits yielded to
participating airlines.
Figure 2.1: Airline Alliances as Strategic Weapons (De la Torre, 1999)
De la Torre (1999) mentions the following major sources of motivation for formation of
alliances:
Increased market coverage and traffic volume
Airlines look for wider market coverage and seek to partner with other carriers operating
complementary networks that will act as "feeders" for their own networks. Through the
use of codesharing, the participating airlines are able to expand the destinations they
offer to customers at little or no additional operating costs. In addition, with an extended
coverage of their frequent flyer programs, their networks can become much more
attractive for their customers. Alliances can also help in gaining access to attractive
airports and provide services to relatively thin markets where it would be unprofitable to
operate services independently (Oum and Park, 1997). Due to increased market coverage
and a competitive market position, airlines gain additional traffic by capturing
passengers that would have flown with competing carriers offering direct or connecting
services. By linking the partners' networks through hub-to-hub links, alliances use each
partner's network to feed traffic to other partner's network.
Reduction in costs
Alliances allow airlines to achieve cost advantages that derive from economies of density,
economies of scope and sharing of common activities. Economies of scope occur when an
existing airline, by expanding its network, can serve new markets at a lower cost than a
new airline can serve them (De la Torre, 1999). Economies of scope are particularly
important under the hub-and-spoke network structure. Under such system, the
introduction of one new spoke to the system increases the number of total O-D markets
served by the airline significantly. Economies of density occur when it is less expensive
for an existing carrier to increase service than it would be for some other carrier to
provide additional service on the same routes. In the case of alliances, there is an increase
in volume of traffic in specific segments of the network. Higher volumes of traffic allow
the use of larger aircrafts which result in lower unit cots.
Sharing of common activities and facilities with alliance partners bring significant
reductions in costs and improve productivity of airlines. The major activity which is also
most frequently coordinated in alliances is the joint operation of flights which has been
called as codesharing. Coordination of ground operations for handling aircraft, or
common check-in and baggage handling facilities at airports can also yield significant
cost reductions. Other coordinated activities with a target of reducing costs include joint
maintenance, joint marketing and joint purchasing.
2.3 Impacts on Customers and Industry
Alliances can benefit customers through increased accessibility, improved service, and
reduced fare levels. Customers have a greater number of paths' to choose from in all
affected O-D markets. Wider network coverage can also produce a stimulation of demand
that will result in additional traffic for the airline. The passengers also have a greater
choice in terms of fare levels. They enjoy a better service from more convenient flight
schedules, increased proportion of online connections, shared lounges on airports and
compatible frequent flyer programs. Some codesharing agreements are implemented in
order to reduce the number of aircrafts operated on routes not likely to be profitable
otherwise. In these situations, there is a consequent decrease of air traffic congestion that
can be beneficial for the industry.
In spite of the above benefits of alliances, certain costs and concerns are also involved.
There are concerns of excess market domination and reduced competition attached to
1 Paths are flights and combinations of flights that will take a traveler from origin to
destination.
alliances resulting in increased scrutiny from regulatory authorities. Oum, Yu and Zhang
(2001) examine the regulatory issues related to international airline alliances primarily in
the United States and European Union community. The impact of alliances on fare levels
is not clear. Brueckner (2001) provides a conceptual framework and simulation analysis
to explain the effects of international alliances on fares, traffic levels and welfare. The
simulation analysis shows that formation of an alliance leads to lower fares and increased
traffic levels in the interline markets while the effects in interhub2 markets can be
opposite. Despite the potential harm to interhub passengers due to increased fare levels,
it is found that the overall consumer surplus and total welfare increases with alliances.
Alliances can also add to congestion at airline hubs because of concentration of traffic
traveling through the hub-to-hub links.
2.4 Revenue Sharing between Partners
It is important to understand that the problem posed by alliances to airline management
lies at two distinct but interrelated levels: contractual and operational (De la Torre,
1999). At the contractual level, the partners have to reach an agreement on seat
allocation and revenue sharing on codeshare flights. At the operational level, the partners
have to separately manage the seat inventory on own flights using their separate revenue
management systems, in order to maximize their own revenues and combined alliance
revenues.
Is the solution to revenue management problem (operational) identical to that of revenue
sharing problem (contractual) for alliances? The answer is both Yes and No. The correct
approach would be to first optimize the combined alliance revenues and then share the
common revenues in a manner which satisfies all the partners involved. The revenue
1 Itinerary completed through booking two or more separate tickets with different airlines.
2 Origin and destination are the hubs of alliance partners.
management analysis would guide the partners on the kind of sharing schemes which
could be beneficial to everyone while simultaneously maximizing the total revenues
available on the table. The goal of revenue sharing scheme shall be that it should allow
each partner to pursue the combined optimal rather than the individual optimal. If it is
decided in the contract that the transfer price (revenue share of operating carrier) would
be same as the codeshare valuation used in the revenue management system then the
solutions to the two problems at hand become identical. However, any feasible
combination of the two is possible; for example, the codeshare valuation could be
dynamic while the transfer price could still be static in which case the two solutions
would be different.
Some studies in the existing literature, for example work by Wright, Groenevelt and
Shumsky (2010), discuss the revenue sharing problem and relate its impacts on the
individual airline behavior and combined revenues. However, the author of this thesis
believes that the revenue management problem needs to be addressed regardless of the
revenue sharing schemes in order to maximize the combined alliance revenues. It will be
explained in Chapter 4 that both partners can gain higher revenues even if the codeshare
valuation is different from the transfer price, though such a transfer price could be
viewed as an unfair distribution of revenues. Moreover, in some cases the codeshare
valuation used in revenue management systems itself could provide a natural link to a
fair revenue sharing scheme, as explained in Chapter 5.
Vinod (2005) suggests an approach to dynamic revenue sharing which makes use of the
passenger name record (PNR) and can result in optimal alliance traffic flow. PNR is a
unique number associated with every airline booking which is either created by an
airline's own computerized reservation system (RES), if the booking is made directly
with an airline or by one of the large global distribution systems (GDS) such as
Amadeus, Sabre, Worldspan, Galileo and Abacus. Detailed information about the airline
distribution channels can be found in the book by Belobaba, Barnhart and Odoni (2009,
p 444). Vinod (2005) suggests that, while accepting a codeshare booking, the dynamic
revenue share can be noted with the PNR for the purpose of revenue resolution. He does
not provide any framework for the implementation of this scheme in airline revenue
management systems.
Wright, Groenevelt and Shumsky (2010) formulate a Markovian game model to discuss
the impacts of transfer prices or revenue sharing agreements. They develop an alliance
game of two airlines and analyze the effects of static and dynamic transfer price schemes
on individual airline behavior. Their findings include following:
1. Static schemes are easy to manage but they can lead to suboptimal decision
making by partners and lost revenues for the alliance as a whole. They can
perform as well as dynamic schemes for certain networks while degrade quickly as
the network parameters change.
2. Performance of dynamic schemes can be significantly reduced if each operating
airline chooses a transfer price to maximize its own revenue.
The above findings are based on equilibrium acceptance policies under each scheme and
their application to numerical analyses of networks of very small size. The model does
not consider any competition and assumes that each partner has perfect information
about its partner's inventory level, and both have identical forecasts over the entire
alliance network. These assumptions are unrealistic in the current state of the industry
and it will be explained in Chapter 3 that airlines are far away from such advancements
and are limited in basic capabilities like getting complete information of a codeshare
itinerary booked by the partner.
2.5 Revenue Management in Alliances
Revenue management lies at the core of airlines' strategies to improve the revenues and
bottom-line. The full potential of alliances cannot be realized without using revenue
management to optimize the combined alliance revenues. In addition, it is even more
important for alliances in order to avoid any potential losses due to sub-optimality which
is caused by the presence of codeshare paths (as demonstrated in Chapter 4). Due to
technical incompatibilities and limitations on the degree of coordination between partners
(as discussed in Chapter 3), alliance revenue management problem presents many
challenges. The ideal solution to the problem would be to combine the networks of the
alliance partners and achieve a centralized solution. This is certainly not possible due to
numerous operational, organizational and regulatory constraints.
Ferea (1996) performed an analysis on the effects of asymmetric revenue management
systems of the alliance partners. He found that specific characteristics of the partners'
networks and their revenue management systems can have a significant impact on the
revenue performance of the alliance as a whole. Boyd (1998) discusses centralized and
decentralized revenue management systems for alliances. A centralized system would
require extreme coordination and information exchange between the partners and is
difficult to implement due to the constraints mentioned above. A decentralized system is
less restrictive and allows the revenue management systems of alliance partners to
operate separately.
Network equilibrium conditions which are proposed by Boyd (1998) and Vinod (2005) for
decentralized revenue management systems can lead to optimal revenues for the
combined alliance. The conditions are based on seat reallocation between partners on a
shared leg. Boyd prescribes the conditions in terms of marginal seat revenue while Vinod
formulates them in terms of bid prices. The idea is that at the equilibrium point,
marginal revenue of an additional seat on a shared leg is identical for each partner and
seats are exchanged between the partners until the marginal seat revenues are balanced.
This approach can lead to joint optimal revenues but it has several limitations for
practical implementation. Airlines in practice estimate the bid prices for their own
operated legs and not the legs operated by partners even if they are codeshared. Thus,
additional capabilities would be needed to implement the above rules besides real time
coordination between partners to update the bid prices and reallocate seats.
De la Torre (1999) discusses various mechanisms of seat allocations for codesharing.
Block space codesharing which is now less prevalent in the industry specifies a fixed or
flexible number of seats which are solely controlled by the marketing carrier. Another
mechanism, automated codesharing or free sale agreement is more dynamic and provides
seamless availability for alliance traffic. Both partners have the power to accept or reject
a sale. This thesis uses free sale agreement for the purpose of simulation experiments.
De la Torre also explains the potential losses to individual airlines due to overvaluation
of the codeshare paths. If the prorates (transfer prices) to be paid to the partner are not
accounted for in the valuation, then it could potentially displace higher revenue yielding
own locals or connecting passengers. He has suggested using a proration scheme to
prevent the individual losses. However, the proration scheme may not be optimal for the
combined alliance revenues as shown in the results in Chapter 4. The author of this
thesis argues that the focus should be rather to maximize the total alliance revenues and
then it can be distributed in a fair manner which satisfies the partners and prevents
losses to any individual carrier.
Darot (2001) provides a simulation analysis of an alliance with two airlines which
compete with another carrier on all the O-D markets. Half of the connecting markets in
the alliance network are own connections while the other half are codeshares leading to
an unrealistically high proportion of codeshare traffic per normal standards. The alliance
partners also share a common hub.
Darot primarily focuses on the issues of customer perception of codeshare flights and
interactions of asymmetric revenue management systems in an alliance. He concludes
that the customer perception can significantly impact the alliance revenues in case of leg
control revenue management methods and low demand markets. He also introduces the
useful concepts of bid price sharing, explained in section 3.5, and bid price inference,
which are found to increase the alliance revenues depending on the codeshare valuation
used in the system. These are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
The alliance revenue management is not limited to handling the codeshare traffic. It is
important to realize that not only codeshare but own local and own connecting traffic is
also affected on a network level. Every seat on a codeshare flight can be potentially
occupied by either a codeshare passenger or an own local or own connecting passenger.
Very few studies, like Darot (2001) and De la Torre (1999), have explicitly considered
and analyzed the network effects of alliance revenue management.
Vinod (2005) suggests using leg bid prices as a common currency for inventory control
among the alliance partners. Lowest available fares in the market can be used as pseudo
bid prices. This would lead to a synchronized availability among the partners on the
codeshare paths but could still be non-optimal in terms of revenue maximization for the
alliance. For the purpose of achieving optimal alliance network traffic flow, he indicates a
dynamic approach as discussed in the previous section.
To the author's knowledge, there is no existing literature which deals with the
implementation details of the alliance revenue management. This thesis is an attempt to
address the practical and relevant questions like how is the codeshare traffic recorded
and forecasted in the revenue management system, how is it valued in the optimizer,
what are the implications for the other traffic components and how can the availability
control be handled in the system so that the alliance revenues are maximized. In
addition, it also fulfills the need of analysis on an alliance network which is realistic in
terms of size, competition and proportion of codeshare traffic.
2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter provides a review of the existing literature on airline alliances. It also
provides a brief overview of airline revenue management, its key components of
overbooking and seat inventory control and useful sources related to them in the
beginning of the chapter. The discussion on airline alliances is structured under various
aspects, covering literature related to motivation for their formation, their impacts on
customers and rest of the industry, revenue sharing and revenue management.
The relation between alliance revenue sharing and alliance revenue management is
explained and the importance of optimizing the combined alliance revenues is
emphasized. It is shown that there is a need for a comprehensive study of the steps
involved in alliance revenue management. Chapter 3 will discuss the challenges involved
in alliance revenue management in practice using illustrations and describes related
techniques, which are either used by airlines or are proposed in the literature.

3. Chapter 3
Alliance Revenue Management in
Practice
The revenue management (RM) systems of airlines aim to maximize the revenues over
their own networks. The major difference and source of complication between individual
airline revenue management and alliance revenue management is the existence of alliance
traffic or codeshare traffic. All codeshare itineraries (except in virtual codesharing, refer
section 1.3) are unique in that they are connecting in nature and only a part of the
itinerary is carried on a flight operated by each alliance partner. As discussed in Chapter
2, there are existing models in the field of operations research which attempt to solve the
alliance revenue management problem. However, they make unrealistic assumptions and
ignore the limitations and complexities which airlines face in the real world. In the
current state of the industry, even airlines with the most advanced RM systems have
found it difficult to make a significant progress towards optimizing the alliance revenues.
This chapter describes the current industry practices and explains the implementation
details of RM system components in the context of codeshare traffic. Some of the
information in this chapter is based on the discussion and feedback obtained from
professionals in the industry.
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Figure 3.1: Key Dimensions of Alliance Revenue Management
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Figure 3.2: Flow of Control between Dimensions of Alliance Revenue Management
Revenue management for alliances, particularly the component of seat inventory control,
can be structured under four key dimensions as shown in Figure 3.1. The flow of control
between these dimensions is explained in Figure 3.2 where the colored boxes show the
different steps involved in alliance revenue management while the boxes adjacent to them
show the different techniques related to each step. In the recording & forecasting step,
the past bookings are recorded in the airline's historical database and used for forecasting
the future demand. The forecast is fed to the optimizer which uses a codeshare valuation
scheme to value the codeshare itineraries. The optimizer consists of seat allocation
method whose output can be used in the availability control step. The availability
control method observes the booking request from a passenger or an alliance partner and
accepts or rejects the request by applying relevant criteria. If the booking is accepted, it
is recorded in the database.
Now we shall study each of these dimensions in detail and discuss the common
techniques and practices in each of them.
3.1 Recording & Forecasting: AVS versus
Cascading
The process of recording the accepted bookings by an airline and subsequently using that
data for forecasting the future demand is termed as recording & forecasting. This forms
one of the initial steps in a typical computerized RM system and is highly dependent on
the airline bookings distribution systems and the form of bookings information available
from them. In the context of alliances, the importance of recording & forecasting can be
understood from the fact that it can affect all other dimensions of alliance revenue
management and can pose serious limitations in terms of which techniques can be used in
the further steps.
The biggest challenge here is to get the complete itinerary information of a codeshare
passenger. Unlike local bookings where passengers travel on a single flight leg, all
codeshare itineraries are unique in that they are connecting and only a part of the
itinerary is carried on a flight operated by each alliance partner. This gives rise to two
possibilities: either an airline has full itinerary information of a codeshare booking
accepted by its partner or it knows only about its own part, a common reason for which
is the limited information provided by airline bookings distribution systems. If an airline
receives the complete itinerary information of a codeshare booking accepted by its
partner, it can perform separate recording & forecasting of the codeshare bookings from
local bookings. Not only complete information from the partner is needed, but also
capabilities of separate recording of codeshares in one's own RM system are required. Let
us have a detailed look into the two common industry practices: AVS and Cascading in
the following subsections.
3.1.1 AVS (Availability Status)
AVS stands for Availability Status and the name comes from the practice of exchanging
availability status messages between airlines in certain instances to communicate the
availability on each other's flights. The messages are purely based on the flight leg and
fare class availability and do not depend on some specific itinerary request. AVS was
practiced in the industry even before the codeshare traffic came into existence, and has
been used by airlines in the absence of seamless availability.
Let us understand AVS in the context of codeshare traffic by taking an example. Figure
3.3 illustrates three codeshare flight legs which are part of an alliance network built of
two carriers: partner 1 and partner 2. Partner 1 operates LAX-ORD leg while partner 2
operates both ORD-LHR and ORD-FRA legs. If partner 1 is using AVS, it would convey
the seat availability by fare class on the LAX-ORD leg to partner 2 for the purpose of
codeshare bookings. As per this fare class availability, partner 2 is allowed to book a
codeshare passenger for any O-D market which uses the LAX-ORD leg. Partner 1 gets no
information of the final destination of such a codeshare passenger booked by partner 2
and would remain indifferent whether it is FRA, LHR or anything else for that matter.
The problem here is quite similar in nature to that of leg based seat allocation control
which cannot distinguish between different connecting itineraries in one's own network.
Even in a case where the combined alliance revenues or partner l's revenue share for a
LAX-LHR booking would be higher than that for a LAX-FRA booking, it is unable to
respond differently to them and provide a preferred availability for one over the other.
This implies that AVS does not have the capabilities of treating codeshare traffic
separately from local traffic and optimizing the combined alliance revenues.
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Figure 3.3: AVS/Local Mapping Example
AVS thus requires that the airlines use a local mapping of codeshare paths, meaning the
codeshare paths are both recorded & forecasted as part of own local paths either due to
incomplete information from partner/distribution systems or due to limited capabilities
of the airline's own RM system. In the above example, Partner 1 records the LAX-
FRA/Q class booking as LAX-ORD/Q while Partner 2 would record it as ORD-FRA/Q.
This becomes a serious limitation in the pursuit of optimizing the alliance revenues,
combined or individually.
There is a caveat to the above in the case of codeshares with multiple connects. The
partner operating multiple legs (ORD-FRA and FRA-TXL in Figure 3.4) may record the
codeshare booking as a connection (own) booking, provided that it has O-D control
capabilities (to distinguish between different itineraries using the same leg, section 3.2.2),
or as local bookings on two legs in case of leg based control.
LAX OR D FATXL
Figure 3.4: AVS/Local Mapping with Multiple Connects
3.1.2 Cascading
In Cascading, the complete codeshare itinerary is known to each partner. It allows the
airlines to use codeshare mapping where codeshare paths are recorded and forecasted
separately from the local paths. This also provides partners with basic capabilities to
react differently to different codeshare requests. In the previous example (Figure 3.3) if
partner 1 uses cascading then it would record the two codeshare bookings, LAX-FRA/Q
and LAX-LHR/Q, separately.
Cascading enables airlines to use the complete itinerary information, to separate
codeshares from locals and from each other, and to produce improved forecasts. It yields
an increase in revenues over AVS as illustrated in Chapter 4. More importantly, it is the
first step in the direction of optimizing the combined alliance revenues. It allows using
alternative valuation schemes for codeshares than local valuation, and bid price sharing
control in further steps, as explained in the forthcoming sections.
3.2 Seat Allocation Methods: Leg versus O-D
Control
The second key dimension of alliance revenue management is the type of seat allocation
method used by alliance partners to optimize their own networks. The airlines offer seats
to customers under various fare classes differing in fare values and associated restrictions.
Seat allocation methods (also known as optimizers) take demand forecasts, by leg/class
or path/class, and the fare values for different fare classes as input and produce the
availability of seats in forms such as booking limits. Leg based control and O-D control
are the two primary types of seat allocation methods which are described in the following
subsections.
3.2.1 Leg Based Control Methods
Leg based control is the conventional seat allocation mechanism which focuses on
optimizing the revenues on a single flight leg. It uses leg/class demand forecasts and
input fare levels of different markets to calculate the seat allocation among fare classes
on a leg. Optimizing the revenues on leg basis does not optimize the revenues over the
whole network. In the case of alliances, this becomes even a greater disadvantage because
the demand forecasts are leg based and the seat availability in a given class would
remain same for all the paths (local, connecting or codeshare) using this leg. Thus the
codeshares get the same availability as the locals even if they are valued using a different
valuation than local valuation scheme (refer section 3.3) if the airline is using leg based
RM control.
The standard approach for leg based seat control for multiple fare classes is EMSR-
Expected Marginal Seat Revenue developed by Belobaba (1987, 1989). EMSR is a
heuristic method which is easier to implement in practice as compared to the optimal
solutions which use multidimensional numerical integration or convolution integrals. A
later refinement of EMSR, called EMSRb (Belobaba, 1992) produces nested booking
limits based on joint protection for upper classes from the next lower class and has been
widely implemented in the industry.
For a complete description of EMSRb refer to Belobaba and Weatherford (1996). We
shall discuss the implementation details of EMSRb here. EMSRb makes the following
modeling assumptions:
a. Demand for each fare class is separate and independent of demand in other
classes.
b. Demand for each fare class is stochastic and can be represented by a
probability distribution.
c. The lowest fare classes book first, followed by the next lower class, and so on.
The seat inventory on a leg is divided into several classes which are serially nested
meaning that the higher fare classes can access the unused lower class seats. Usually the
demand for each fare class is described by an independent Gaussian distribution. The
mean and standard deviation are determined for each fare class based on detruncated
historical data. These are also used to produce mean and standard deviation for joint
classes, defined as the combination of each fare class and classes above it.
The problem is to find seat protection levels for higher classes, and booking limits for
lower classes. Figure 3.5 shows how nested booking limits work in a fare structure with
three fare classes- Y, M and Q, class Y being the highest fare. The capacity (CAP) of
flight leg is 100 seats. Protected seats are the seats that are saved particularly for fare
classes which are higher than a given fare class (Figure 3.5). The booking limit for all
bookings that occur in a fare class and its lower classes is determined by subtracting the
number of seats to be saved for higher classes from the capacity.
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Figure 3.5: Nested Booking Limits in EMSRb
The mathematical framework of EMSRb follows a top down approach meaning that it
begins with protecting seats for the top most class, say class 1 from the immediately
lower class- class 2. The required protection for class 1- 7r12 and the consequent booking
limit for class 2- BL2 satisfy equations 3.1 and 3.2:
EMSR1 (ir12) = F1 x P(x 1 " t 1 2 ) = F2 (3.1)
(3.2)
where,
BL2 = CAP -7r12
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Equation 3.2 estimates the probability value P(X 1 > 7n1 2 ) which is then mapped to the
corresponding value of the seat protection level using the demand distribution of the
class 1. While dealing with a lower class i, a joint protection is calculated for all the
above classes and a booking limit is estimated by replacing the appropriate parameters in
the above equations by their joint counterparts as shown in equation 3.3:
EMSR1,2,.-1(n) = F1,2,-..-1 X P(X1 ,2 ,..i- 1 > 7) = Fi (3.3)
i-1
F1,2,..-1 = i X Fk.4)
1 kk=1
BLi = CAP - 7r (3.5)
The fare value (F1, 2 ,..i- 1) used for joint protection in the above equation is a weighted
average of the individual fare values, mean forecast being the weights. The estimated
probability value is then used to calculate the joint protection using the distribution of a
multivariate function J() which is sum of the individual demands as shown in equation
3.6. Since the demand for different fare classes is assumed to be independent, the mean
and variance calculations are given by equations 3.7 and 3.8:
i-1
J(X1,X 2 , --- ,Xi- 1 ) = Xk (3.6)
k=1
i-I
/1,2,..i-1 k
k=1
i-1
1,2,i-1 2(38)
k=1
3.2.2 O-D Control Methods
Origin-Destination (O-D) control methods enable an airline to distinguish between the
booking requests based on O-D market information and act differently to each of them.
There are two major limitations of leg based control which can be addressed using O-D
control methods as explained in Belobaba (2002):
a. In situations where a short haul flight leg has high demand while some of the
legs connecting to it are expected to have many empty seats, the limited fare
class availability on that short haul flight leg can block the long haul
passengers willing to pay a higher total itinerary fare. This strategy will not
maximize the total network revenues.
b. The leg based control is unable to distinguish between O-D itineraries in the
same fare class. In a given leg/class, the availability remains same for all O-D
markets traversing that leg. However, two local passengers generate
substantially more network revenue than a connecting passenger traversing
those two legs.
O-D control and cascading together provides the ability to treat codeshare traffic
separately than local traffic in the RM system. In the context of alliances, it is important
to mention that due to the presence of codeshare paths and their fixed and arbitrary
valuation (section 3.3), the O-D control becomes sub optimal and its full benefits are not
realized. This issue will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 4. O-D control can be
implemented in a variety of ways. The two common approaches which are based on
deterministic shadow prices and probabilistic bid prices are discussed in detail here.
3.2.2.1 Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting (DA VN)
DAVN is an O-D control method which uses displacement costs (also called as shadow
prices) to adjust the total O-D fares of connecting itineraries and estimate their actual
network contribution. It uses the framework of serially nested virtual buckets each of
which contain several path/classes depending on their actual network contribution. For a
leg that is traversed by a connecting itinerary, the passenger's total O-D fare (ODF) will
be replaced in the bucketing by a so-called "pseudo-fare" computed as the actual fare
minus the sum of the displacement costs associated with all other legs involved in the
itinerary. The principle is to apply a penalty to the connecting fares that accounts for the
potential displacement of a local passenger. For a complete description of DAVN, refer to
Williamson (1992).
The actual contribution of a passenger on a given flight leg to the total airline network
revenue must be less than or equal to the total O-D fare (ODF) of the passenger's
itinerary. This is because connecting passengers accepted on a given flight leg can
displace other passengers and revenue on down-line (or up-line) legs of their itinerary.
When the connecting flight legs have high forecasted demand, the corresponding
displacement costs will be higher, reducing the displacement adjusted network revenue
value of the ODF. With a lower network value, this ODF would be mapped to a lower
virtual class for seat inventory control purposes, meaning the seat availability for
connecting passengers is reduced. At the same time, local passengers (with no down-line
displacement costs) would get greater seat availability.
The mathematical problem is therefore how to determine the network revenue
contribution of each ODF. The answers come from various mathematical models that
have been applied to the airline network RM problem. DAVN applies deterministic linear
programming (LP) to calculate the shadow prices (displacement costs) of all the legs in
an airline's network and uses them to estimate the network value of all connecting
passengers. The deterministic LP formulation is given by equations 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11:
max p ixx3
path i class j
subject to
x! < f V path i, class j (3.10)
path i class xlegk (3.11)
where,
p! = Fare value of class j on path i
x! = Number of passengers in class j on path i
f|J = Mean forecast for class j on path i
Ck = Capacity on leg k
S = Binary variable, set to 1 if leg k is part of path i, 0 otherwise
The above formulation is based on maximizing the total revenues over the network
subject to two constraints. The first one is a forecast constraint for each path/class
stating that the number of passengers accepted in a path/class cannot be greater than its
mean forecast. The second one is a capacity constraint applied to each leg in the
network. The solution of this LP provides optimal values for the decision variables x,
but we are interested in the solution to its dual problem. The solution to its dual
problem is the displacement cost vector dk which represents for each leg k, the marginal
revenue obtained by adding an extra seat to the capacity on that leg. These values are
used in the bucketing process for estimating the network revenue contribution of the
connecting passengers. On a leg i that belongs to the connecting itinerary, the connecting
fare will be replaced in the bucketing by the total O-D fare minus the sum of the
displacement costs associated with all other legs involved in the itinerary as shown in
equation 3.12:
Bucketed Farejeg i = ODFare - d;
jierary (3.12)
where,
d; = displacement cost associated with leg j
The bucketing is managed on the leg level in DAVN. The displacement costs as well as
the size of the buckets are regularly re-optimized during the booking process. A
connecting booking is accepted only if on every leg of that itinerary, the corresponding
fare is in a bucket that is still open. Use of DAVN or any other network optimization
method requires path/class forecasting and detruncation. A note about the robustness of
DAVN as an O-D control method- it is found that the nested bucketing framework of
DAVN makes it more robust to the inaccuracy of input data than other methods (Bratu,
1998). The nested virtual buckets provide a range for decision making and thus building
robustness into the system.
3.2.2.2 Probabilistic Bid Price (ProBP)
ProBP lies under a different class of O-D control methods which use bid prices for seat
availability control. Unlike DAVN which uses a deterministic LP algorithm, ProBP takes
into account the stochastic nature of demand in the algorithm itself. It is one of the most
advanced O-D control methods and relies exclusively on the path/class forecasts.
Nonetheless, it is found to be more sensitive to the accuracy of demand forecasts required
as input. For a detailed description of ProBP, refer to Bratu (1998).
ProBP is based on iteratively prorating fares of the connecting itineraries along the legs
they traverse. The network revenue value generated by a connecting itinerary on a leg is
the prorated fare of that itinerary on that leg. This proration is different for different
itineraries in the network and is also different in different time frames of the booking
period for the same itinerary. It is an optimal solution which accounts for the current
network conditions and stochastic nature of the demand. ProBP uses critical EMSR
values of the traversed legs for the purpose of proration. Critical EMSR value, EMSRc
is defined as the expected revenue value of the lowest fare seat available on a leg
obtained from the EMSRb model (section 3.2.1). Figure 3.6 illustrates the calculations
for a typical leg, LAX-ORD in this case. The EMSR values are plotted for all the
itineraries (paths/classes) which traverse LAX-ORD leg, using the prorated fare
estimated for every itinerary. The value of the EMSR curve which intersects the capacity
left line is the EMSRc value. At the end of the iterative process of ProBP, these EMSRc
values become bid prices of the given legs and used for the purpose of seat allocation.
EMSR LAX-LGA/Y
LAX-FRA/Y
LAX-FRA/M
O-D/Class...
O-D/Class...
................................... .. EMSRc
SeatsCapacity-Left'
Figure 3.6: Estimation of EMSRc on a Leg (LAX-ORD)
ProBP is an iterative process where the prorated fares are updated at each step using the
new set of critical EMSR values estimated in the last step. The prorated fare PRF [j,k] of
a connecting ODF j on leg k is defined by equations 3.13 and 3.14:
EMSRc(m) x f
oo PRFU, k] = /meL EMSRc(m)' if mEL EMSRc(m) # 0 (3.13)
oo PRFU, k] = fcard (L)' if ZmEL, EMSRc(m) = 0 (3.14)
where,
Li = set of legs which form connecting ODF j
fj = Total fare value of the connecting ODF j
card(Lj) = cardinality of set L
Thus the prorated fare of a connecting ODF on a leg is the ratio of the critical EMSR
value on the leg and the sum of the critical EMSR values on all the traversed legs, times
the total fare. If the sum of the critical EMSR is null (equation 3.14) then the fare is
evenly distributed over all the traversed legs. Since critical EMSR values are by
definition positive, this corresponds to the case where all the EMSRc are zeros for all the
traversed legs. This happens when the demand forecast is well below the capacity on all
the legs belonging to Li.
Set the PRF equal to total
Compute EMSRc values for
-alle frorn EMSRb model
Prorate the fares
N, NO
s the convergence criteria
satisfied?
YES
Use the converged PRF as
inputs to calculate bid prices
Figure 3.7: ProBP Iteration Steps (adapted from Bratu, 1998)
ProBP iterates the calculations until the convergence criterion on prorated fares is
satisfied for all the ODFs over all the legs. Figure 3.7 summarizes the prorated fare
convergence method. Finally, ProBP accepts an itinerary request only if the
corresponding itinerary fare is greater than the sum of the bid prices (final EMSRc
values) of the traversed legs of that itinerary.
3.3 Codeshare Valuation
Codeshare valuation refers to the fare inputs related to the codeshare paths used by an
airline in its revenue management system and/or distribution system. These are fed as an
input to the seat allocation tool or optimizer. Each airline runs its own optimizer and
aims to maximize the individual revenues. The seat availability, as estimated by the
optimizer, depends on the valuation. All else being equal, a higher codeshare valuation
would lead to a higher availability for codeshare paths and vice versa. In the context of
alliances, it is important to recognize that there is a tradeoff between different traffic
components and every codeshare booking potentially replaces either a local or a
connecting passenger.
Codeshare valuation can be primarily categorized into two types: static and dynamic.
The static valuation schemes are explained in detail in this section while Chapter 5 will
explain the dynamic valuation scheme. It should be emphasized here that the codeshare
valuation which achieves higher combined alliance revenues may not necessarily lead to
higher individual revenues for each partner because the individual partners' revenues
depend on the revenue sharing contracts.
The two static valuation schemes which are common in the industry are local fares and
static proration valuation schemes. Another scheme which is not often used is the total
fares valuation scheme. A detailed description of each scheme will be now provided using
an example shown in Table 3.1. The codeshare request under consideration is LAX-
FRA/Q class, a two leg itinerary, LAX-ORD being operated by partner 1 and ORD-FRA
being operated by partner 2 in the alliance. The fare values for the local and codeshare
paths are shown.
Table 3.1: Fares (Q class) for Local and Codeshare Paths
3.3.1 Local Fares Valuation Scheme
A quite simplistic and non-optimal way to handle codeshare bookings is to treat them as
local bookings on the traversed flight legs. This minimizes the complexities and does not
call for any substantial changes in the RM system (De la Torre, 1999). In this approach,
the partners value codeshare bookings at local fares, which are fares on the traversed legs
operated by each of them. In the LAX-FRA/Q example (table 3.1) partner 1 would value
codeshare bookings at $ 248 (LAX-ORD/Q local) while partner 2 would value them at $
532 (ORD-FRA/Q local). Thus, the optimizer treats the codeshare demand in the same
manner as the local demand on a leg. This is naive in a manner similar to treating an
own connecting passenger equivalent to local passengers on the two traversed legs as is
done in leg based control.
Note that the local fares valuation would result in an overvaluation in most of the cases,
in the sense that the sum of the valuations used by partners would exceed the total
codeshare fare. In the example above, the sum of valuations is $ 780 which exceeds the
Booking O-D/Class Marketing Airline Fare
LAX-ORD/Q P1 (Local) $ 248
ORD-FRA/Q P2 (Local) $ 532
LAX-FRA/Q P1, P2 (Codeshare) $ 619
actual codeshare fare by $161. To state it formally, in the case of an alliance with two
partners, both using local fare valuation:
L, +L 2 > T (3.15)
where,
L1 = Local fare valuation on Partner 1's leg
L2 = Local fare valuation on Partner 2's leg
T = Total ODF for the codeshare path
This is the only codeshare valuation scheme which can be used with AVS/Local mapping
method of recording & forecasting of codeshares as described in section 3.1.1. All other
codeshare valuation schemes which treat codeshares different than locals require separate
forecasting as discussed in cascading.
3.3.2 Static Prorate Valuation Scheme
A static prorate valuation scheme provides a different treatment to codeshare demand
from the local demand and remains unchanged for a given path/class during the booking
period. It is based on the logic that local fare valuation scheme overvalues the codeshare
paths and that the sum of airlines' codeshare valuations should be exactly equal to the
total revenue available from the codeshare booking. Typically, in this scheme the
proration for valuation is identical to the revenue share negotiated in the contract. There
are several ways to estimate the valuation using this scheme and the most common ones
are following:
a. Fixed percentage: Each partner values the codeshare paths at a fixed percentage
of the total fare in their optimizer. The individual percentages should sum up to
100%. They can be same for all the codeshare paths or different for different
paths like the other two static prorate valuation schemes described here.
b. Y-Prorate: This scheme uses the ratio of full coach (Y) local fares on the
traversed legs of the codeshare path in order to calculate the proration for
valuation in the optimizer. The ratio is different for each codeshare path.
c. Proration by miles flown: This scheme uses the mileage flown on the traversed
legs to calculate the proration used for the purpose of valuation. Again, this is
different for each codeshare path.
This thesis uses Y-Prorate scheme for the purpose of static prorate valuation analysis in
Chapter 4. It is useful to know that the Y-Prorate scheme values codeshare paths at a
lower value than local fare valuation scheme addressing the problem of overvaluation. In
the LAX-FRA/Q example (table 3.1), let us assume that the ratio of Y-fares on two legs
is 1:2. Partner 1 would value codeshare booking LAX-FRA/Q at $ 206.33 while partner
2 would value it at $ 412.67. Thus in the case of an alliance of two airlines, both using Y-
Prorate valuation, the sum of airlines' codeshare valuations satisfies equation 3.16:
Y1 + Y2 = T (3.16)
where,
Y = Y - Prorated fare valuation on Partner 1's leg
Y2 = Y - Prorated fare valuation on Partner 2's leg
T = Total ODF for the codeshare path
3.3.3 Total Fares Valuation Scheme
In the total fares valuation scheme, an alliance partner values every codeshare path at its
total fare value. This scheme also treats codeshares separately from locals like the static
prorate valuation schemes but instead of any proration, it uses the complete fare value.
This results in double counting by the partners and an overvaluation of the codeshare
paths yielding their higher availability. In the LAX-FRA/Q example (Table 3.1), under
total valuation scheme both partners would value codeshare bookings at $ 619. Thus in
case of an alliance with both partners using total fare valuation, equation 3.17 is
satisfied:
TF1 + TF2 = 2T (3.17)
where,
TF1 = Total Fare valuation on Partner 1's leg
TF2 = Total Fare valuation on Partner 2's leg
T = Total ODF for the codeshare path
3.4 Availability Control: Standard versus
Bid Price Sharing
Availability control is the last step in alliance revenue management which is executed to
take accept/reject decision on a booking request. Usually, the availability control is a
part of the seat allocation step in airline revenue management and is not dealt
separately. However, in the case of alliances, availability control for codeshare paths can
be tweaked to produce different availability from that suggested by the optimizer. For
example: the codeshare path LAX-FRA/Q can be manually mapped to a higher
class/virtual bucket in order to increase its availability or it can be mapped to a lower
class/virtual bucket to decrease its availability.
We shall see in Chapter 4 that this kind of intervention can help in increasing alliance
revenues, but only under certain conditions. In the following subsections, we first
describe the standard availability control for codeshare paths which does not require any
kind of intervention and then the bid price sharing control which overrides the decision
of seat allocation optimizer based on partner's bid prices.
3.4.1 Standard Availability Control
In the standard procedure for availability control, accept/reject decision for a booking
request is based on a direct comparison of its fare value or its valuation in the system
with the current buckets or bid prices. This is similar to the seat allocation controls used
for local and connecting paths and is discussed in section 3.2. The only difference here is
that in the case of codeshare paths the codeshare valuation (static/dynamic) is used for
comparison. To understand this clearly, consider our previous example from section 3.1.
The codeshare request under consideration is LAX-FRA/Q class, a two leg itinerary,
LAX-ORD being operated by partner 1 and ORD-FRA being operated by partner 2 in
the alliance (Figure 3.8). Assume that partner 1 is using DAVN as the seat allocation
optimizer and using local valuation for codeshare paths. Now for the purpose of
availability control it compares the valuation of the codeshare booking request (local fare
valuation: $ 248) and maps it to the appropriate virtual bucket (Figure 3.9). The
booking is accepted or rejected based on the open/close status of that virtual bucket.
This example shows a conceptual implementation of the standard availability control in
DAVN. The practice at different airlines could vary in terms of number of buckets and
sequence of the steps. On the other hand, in the case of the bid price algorithms like
ProBP, the codeshare valuation is compared against the bid price of own leg to
accept/reject a codeshare request. Thus, in the above example if the estimated bid price
value on LAX-ORD leg is greater than $ 248, the codeshare request is rejected.
LAX ORDF
Figure 3.8: Codeshare Itinerary (LAX-FRA/Q)
Figure 3.9: Standard Availability Control in DAVN for Alliance Partner 1
3.4.2 Bid Price Sharing Control
Bid price sharing control is a special technique of availability control which attempts to
take into account the displacement costs incurred on partner's operated legs and make an
intelligent decision for the benefit of the combined alliance. When the partners use O-D
seat control methods, they estimate the shadow prices or bid prices for all the legs
operated by them. Darot (2001) suggests that the partners can share the displacement
costs or bid prices related to the codeshare legs and use this information during the
availability control. He terms this mechanism as "bid price sharing" (for sharing shadow
prices, bid prices or other forms of displacement cost), which is a prerequisite in order to
execute the bid price sharing control. Figure 3.10 is an adaption from Darot (2001) and
explains the bid price sharing control mechanism.
Partner 1:
Bid Price
Computation
ISeparate Optimization
Part ner 2: ,
Bid Prices
Bid Price Sharing
N
1t the end of each timeN
frame
Bid Prices
Booking Request
Availability Decision
Control
Booking Request
Decision
Figure 3.10: Bid Price Sharing Control (adapted from Darot, 2001)
The partners run their optimizers separately and calculate the bid prices over their own
networks. They share the bid prices related to codeshare legs at the end of each
timeframe (interval between two successive runs of the optimizer). These shared bid
prices of the partner are then used in the next timeframe to execute the bid price sharing
control.
The implementation details of bid price sharing control are discussed now. In the case of
an alliance with two partners both using DAVN as the optimizer, they share the shadow
prices and execute the bid price sharing control as per equation 3.18. In case of ProBP or
other bid price algorithms, equation 3.19 is used.
p SPartner - EMSRown
TBPa-tner 
- own
(3.18)
(3.19)
where,
SPSJtner = Shadow Price on partner's codeshare leg in previous time frame
EMSRtwn = Lowest open bucket on own codeshare leg in current time frame
BPpatner = Bid price on partner's codeshare leg in previous time frame
BPWIL = Bid price on own codeshare leg in current time frame
T = Total ODF for the codeshare path
Let us have a look at the application of bid price sharing control for the same example
which we used for the standard availability control. Assuming that both partners are
using DAVN, the equation for partner 1 operating LAX-ORD leg becomes:
$ 619 - SPar tner > $ 180 (3.20)
Thus accept/reject decision now depends on the total fare and partner's shadow price
instead of own valuation of the codeshare path. The lowest available bucket in partner
l's system is $ 180. Thus, if partner 2's shadow price on ORD-FRA leg is greater than
$439 then partner 1 rejects the codeshare booking request.
Bid price sharing can be subjected to legal permissions and antitrust immunity might be
required to allow sharing of information between the partners. Darot (2001) also
discusses an alternative technique called bid price inference where instead of sharing any
real bid prices, partners try to infer them approximately from the publicly available fares
on each other's codeshare legs. It should be noted that bid price sharing control does not
affect the optimization step and the valuation scheme for codeshare paths also remains
same (local/proration). It acts only at the end to override the decision made using
standard availability control method. Thus it acts more like a corrective step which
attempts to correct the effects of fixed and arbitrary codeshare valuation inputs used in
the optimizer. It uses partner's bid prices which are in fact the output from partner's
optimizer and in turn dependent on the codeshare valuation inputs used by it. Therefore,
the results of bid price sharing control method can be affected by the codeshare valuation
inputs used to estimate the bid prices.
3.4.3 Synchronized Availability
The codeshare availability is not synchronized among the alliance partners many times.
The partners may show different fares and availability for codeshare paths in the
distribution systems. This is due in part to the inconsistent information in airline
bookings distribution systems. Apart from availability, there are problems of
synchronization when seat assignment or boarding passes issued by one airline are not
recognized by partner, or the frequent flyer miles are not honored. In addition, the
availability can be different when partners have asymmetric RM systems and lack
seamless connectivity as described in the next section.
3.5 Asymmetric Systems and Capabilities
The problem of alliance revenue management becomes more complex and realistic when
asymmetric RM systems are considered. In reality, it is uncommon to find two alliance
partners with exactly the same RM capabilities. Some partners in the alliance may be
using leg based control while others may have advanced O-D control systems. Even
under O-D control, there are several methods which may produce different types of
information as described under section 3.2. Another source of asymmetry is the codeshare
valuation. It is quite possible that the partners do not use same valuation schemes in
their individual RM systems. This asymmetry can lead to unsynchronized availability on
codeshare paths. In addition, they may face more challenges while using advanced
techniques like bid price sharing control or dynamic valuation, as discussed in Chapter 5.
Vinod (2005) suggests using leg bid prices as a common currency for inventory control
among the alliance partners. This may lead to a synchronized availability among the
partners. The leg bid prices are estimated using bid price algorithms like ProBP as
discussed under the section 3.2.2.2. There are also other methods which approximate the
bid prices such as bid price inference (Darot, 2001). However, the propriety of bid prices
and their standardization among the alliance partners can be another challenge.
3.6 Alliance RM: Summary and Example
Table 3.2 provides a complete summary of the various components of alliance revenue
management with the help of the example shown in Figure 3.8. The codeshare request
under consideration is LAX-FRA/Q class, a two leg itinerary, LAX-ORD being operated
by partner 1 and ORD-FRA being operated by partner 2 in the alliance. Table 3.2
illustrates the revenue management components only for partner 1 and separately for
AVS and Cascading. It should be noted that the alternative codeshare valuation schemes
and bid price sharing control are possible with cascading only.
RM Component AVS Local Mapping Cascading CS Mapping
Request Information LAX-ORD/Q LAX-FRA/Q
Forecast of CS Path Combined with LAX- Separate LAX-FRA/Q CS
Demand ORD/Q Local Path
Seat Allocation Method Both Leg and O-D Control Both Leg and O-D Control
possible possible
Valuation of CS Path LAX-ORD/Q @ Local Fare LAX-FRA/Q @ any CS
Valuation only Valuation Scheme
Standard Availability Same as LAX-ORD/Q LAX-FRA/Q @ CS
Local Path Valuation Scheme
Bid Price Sharing Control Not Possible LAX-FRA/Q @ (Total
Fare - BP 2 )
CS: Codeshare, BP 2: Bid Price of Partner 2
Table 3.2: Revenue Management and Availability Options for Partner 1
3.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter provides a detailed discussion on the challenges involved in alliance revenue
management. The codeshare paths in alliances present complexities on many fronts, from
getting itinerary information to making an availability decision on a booking request.
The discussion is structured under four key dimensions of alliance revenue management.
Each dimension is explained in detail with the help of relevant examples.
The recording & forecasting of codeshare demand depends on the degree of information
(full or partial) received from the alliance partner. The codeshares can be recorded &
forecasted only as locals if the full information of an itinerary booked by a partner is not
available. Cascading, which requires full itinerary information from the partner, is a
prerequisite to use alternative valuation schemes other than local valuation. It is also
needed for using advanced techniques for handling codeshare paths such as bid price
sharing control in availability and dynamic valuation in RM optimizer.
O-D seat allocation control is also necessary to provide a differential treatment to
codeshare passengers from local passengers and to distinguish between different codeshare
itineraries using the same leg. The two common O-D control methods are Displacement
Adjusted Virtual Nesting (DAVN) and Probabilistic Bid Pricing (ProBP). DAVN is
based on estimating the network revenue contribution of itineraries using deterministic
linear programming. ProBP depends on the optimal proration of fares of all itineraries
over the traversed legs and uses an iterative algorithm to calculate leg bid prices.
Codeshare valuation in the optimizer can control the amount of codeshare traffic and
hence other traffic components as well due to network effects. The static valuation
remains constant throughout the booking period and does not account for the stochastic
nature of demand. Among the static valuation schemes, both total valuation and local
valuation overvalue the codeshare bookings in that the sum of airlines' codeshare
valuations exceed the total codeshare fare while static prorate valuation sums up to the
exact amount of codeshare fare.
Bid price sharing is the mechanism of sharing displacement costs (bid prices or shadow
prices) between the partners. The partner's bid prices can be used in availability control
to override the output from the optimizer and use bid price sharing control to
accept/reject a codeshare booking request. Though bid price sharing control accounts for
the partner's opportunity cost, it does not use it in the optimizer.
Chapter 4 will present an in depth simulation analysis of all the techniques discussed in
this chapter and will explain the advantages and disadvantages of each of them.

4. Chapter 4
PODS Simulations: Experimental
Setup and Results
This chapter presents simulation results which are obtained using the Passenger Origin
Destination Simulator (PODS). The first section of this chapter provides a brief overview
of PODS and its different components. The next section provides details of the
simulation environment. It lays out the network structure which is used for simulations
and presents a baseline case for the purpose of comparisons. The remaining sections
present findings from numerous experiments related to the different dimensions of
alliance revenue management. Detailed explanation is provided for the observed results
under each section.
4.1 PODS Overview
PODS is a software simulation tool originally developed at Boeing by Hopperstad, Berge,
and Filipowski in the mid-1990s. It has been further developed and used by the MIT-
PODS Revenue Management Research Consortium which receives participation from
nine leading airlines of the world. PODS is used to test the performance of different
airline revenue management techniques and strategies in a competitive environment.
With multiple airlines serving numerous markets, PODS is capable of simulating airline
competition over a multiple-day booking period. For any given flight departure in PODS,
passengers start booking 63 days before departure. This 63 day period is divided into 16
time frames unevenly such that there are more time frames close to the departure.
PODS simulate the airline booking process with two separate but interactive
components, namely (i) Passenger Choice Model and (ii) Airline Revenue Management
System. Figure 4.1 illustrates the successive steps in each component and interaction
between the two components.
Figure 4.1: PODS Architecture (Belobaba, 2010)
A brief overview of the PODS components is presented in the following subsections. For
more information, see Belobaba (2010), Hopperstad (2005), and PODS related theses at
MIT like Carrier (2003), Gorin (2000) Lee (2000) and Tam (2008).
4.1.1 PODS Passenger Choice Model
The Passenger Choice Model in PODS generates passengers and their individual
preferences. It simulates their decision processes based on these preferences and relative
path/class availability of seats on flights. The left component of Figure 4.1 illustrates the
four major steps of the Passenger Choice Model. Its first step is demand generation based
on the average total daily demand for air travel for each O-D market specified by the
user. This total demand is split between leisure and business passengers as per the data
from airline industry, for example 40% business and 60% leisure passengers. The arrival
of passengers of each type is set according to booking curves which specify the percentage
of arrivals of each type in each of the 16 time frames. The business passengers usually
arrive later in the booking process than leisure passengers. Note that, as in the real
world, the airlines in PODS do not know the underlying market demand and its split.
They can only build a history of the accepted bookings and use that to predict the future
demand.
PODS is capable of generating random variability in the user inputs of demand using
Gaussian distributions. It simulates multiple repetitions of the same departure day and
each repetition draws demand inputs randomly from specified distributions. In fact, each
PODS simulation performed for this research consists of 2 independent sets of trials, each
composed of 600 successive (and thus correlated) simulations of departure days.
The next two steps are generating passenger characteristics (preferences) and
consequently their choice sets. Each passenger is assigned a time of travel preference, a
maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP)' and a set of disutility costs to represent his/her
sensitivity to different travel attributes such as schedule time, fare product restrictions,
path quality (nonstop vs. connecting) and airline preference. Based on the characteristics
1 Maximum WTP represents the maximum fare value a passenger is willing to pay.
of each passenger, PODS determines the complete set of available path/class options at
any point of time (Figure 4.1). These path/class options are ranked in the order of total
cost, which is a sum of an option's fare price and the applicable disutility costs. Lastly,
the passenger decides on the lowest total cost feasible option. This simulated purchase
then becomes a booking and is stored in the corresponding airline's Historical Bookings
Database. If no feasible option exists in the passenger's choice set, it translates into a "no
-go" and the passenger chooses not to travel.
4.1.2 Revenue Management System
The Revenue Management (RM) System represents the airline side in PODS and is made
up of three components: Historical Bookings Database, Forecaster and Seat Allocation
Optimizer. The Historical Bookings Database records every booking for a given airline by
leg/class or path/class. The database requires some default bookings at the start of the
simulation which are replaced by actual observed bookings as the simulation progresses.
The Forecaster utilizes the booking data from the database to provide a forecast of
future demand by leg/class or by path/class. This also includes the detruncation of
closed observations to account for the actual demand (see section 2.1). The forecast is
then fed to the Seat Allocation Optimizer which determines the availability of fare
classes on every leg/path. This fare class availability provides a link between the two
parent components in PODS. It is the output of the Seat Allocation Optimizer of the RM
system fed as an input to the Passenger Choice Set step of the Passenger Choice Model
(see Figure 4.1).
All the three components of RM System described above are relevant for this research on
airline alliances. Each of them has been discussed in more detail, in the context of
alliances, in Chapter 3. This chapter presents an experimental analysis of the different
techniques under each of these components, applied to the case of alliances.
4.2 Simulation Environment: Alliance
Network- A4 and Baseline Case
Alliance network A4 consists of a simplified international alliance network of two airlines,
namely Airline 2 (AL 2) and Airline 4 (AL 4). It includes two other competing carriers,
Airline 1 (AL 1) and Airline 3 (AL 3) and all the four airlines have hubs' in United
States as shown in Figure 4.2. Traffic is assumed to flow in a single direction from cities
on the west of a hub to those on its east, with the premise that the other direction would
have the same demand behavior. AL 2 with a hub at ORD is the Partner 1 in the
alliance which flies to international destinations on the east. AL 4 with a hub at DFW is
the Partner 2 in the alliance providing service from international destinations on the
west. AL 1 with a hub at MSP is a network carrier which competes with alliance carriers
on all the routes while AL 3 having a hub at MCI represents a low cost carrier (LCC) 2.
Figures 4.2 displays the network map with airlines' hubs and all the cities served. Figure
4.3 and 4.4 show the codeshare paths via each of the alliance partner's hubs while the
double connect3 codeshare paths are shown in Figure 4.5.
'Hubs are airports which facilitate connecting passengers by coordinating timings of inbound and
outbound flights.
2 LCCs usually fly many point to point flights surpassing hubs and have a fare structure with
lower fares and fewer restrictions.
3 Codeshare paths with two connecting stops between origin and destination.
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Figure 4.2: Network A4: Hubs and Cities
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Figure 4.4 Codeshare Paths via AL 4 Hub- DFW
Figure 4.5: Double Connect Codeshare Paths
Network A4 is a modified version of Network TI in PODS. For a detailed description of
Network T1, refer to Boyer (2010). Network A4 consists of 40 spoke cities which result in
444 flight legs and 572 O-D markets in total. Out of the 572 markets, AL 3 is present in
296 markets which are known as LCC markets. The LCC markets have a less restricted
fare structure while the other 276 non-LCC markets use a more restricted fare structure
as shown in Table 4.1 and 4.2. The AP column specifies the advance purchase
requirement for a fare class in days. The next three columns represent a set of
restrictions on fare classes and are applicable only if their corresponding entry is 1.
Fare
Class
Avg. Fare AP
Cancel
Min Stay Fel
Fee
Non
Refund
$ 1,507
4 $ 729
6 $ 455 21 1 1 1
Table 4.1: More Restricted Fare Structure for non-LCC markets
Avg. Fare AP
Cancel
Min Stay Fe
Fee
2 $ 251
$ 146
6 $ 105 14 0 1 1
Table 4.2: Less Restricted Fare Structure for LCC markets
Fare
Class
Non
Refund
Now we form a baseline case for network A4 which will be used for all the comparisons in
this chapter, unless otherwise stated. In the baseline case, the alliance carriers (AL 2 and
AL 4) use a leg based seat allocation method- EMSRb (section 3.2) while AL 1 uses an
O-D control method- DAVN and AL 3 uses the adaptive load factor threshold method1
with a target load factor of 90%. Regarding the four dimensions of alliance revenue
management (see Chapter 3), both partners in the alliance use the following in the
baseline case:
(i) AVS for the purpose of recording & forecasting
(ii) EMSRb as the seat allocation method
(iii) Local fare valuation scheme to value codeshare demand at local fares in the
optimizer
(iv) Standard availability control method to accept/reject a codeshare booking
request
Firstly, we present the performance statistics related to the baseline case in Table 4.3:
AIRLINE ASM RPM LF (%) REVENUE 2  YIELD(/RPM)
2-EMSRb 16,705,610 13,578,447 81.28 $ 2,117,125 $ 0.1559
4-EMSRb 20,455,180 17,152,174 83.85 $ 2,561,975 $ 0.1494
Table 4.3: Baseline Performance Statistics
Throughout our analysis in this chapter, the alliance partners share the codeshare
revenues using Y-Proration, i.e. in the ratio of Y class (class 1) fares on the traversed
1 In this method, a load factor threshold between 0% and 100% is associated with each fare class,
and a class is closed down as soon as the booked load reaches the associated threshold level for
that class.
2 Revenues before codeshare resolution in the case of alliance carriers.
codeshare legs. Net revenues are calculated after accounting for the codeshare payments
as shown in the Table 4.4. All the revenue comparisons for alliance partners will be made
using net revenues, unless otherwise stated.
AIRLINE REVENUE PAYMENT PAYMENT NET(PIE-RESOLUTION) SENT RECEIVED REVENUE
4-EMSRb $ 2,561,975 $ 340,310 $ 341,227 $ 2,562,892
Table 4.4: Baseline Codeshare Revenue Resolution
The passenger mix in the baseline case is shown in Table 4.5. It has been divided into
four components, namely:
(i) LOC: Local traffic (refer section 1.2), can be booked only by an airline itself.
(ii) CNX: Connecting traffic, again can be booked only by an airline itself.
(iii) OWN CS: Codeshare traffic booked by an airline itself. Also simply referred to
as CS.
(iv) PART CS: Codeshare traffic booked by alliance partner.
AL LOC CNX OWN CS PART CS
2-EMSRb 3426 2484 594 558
4-EMSRb 2921 3679 558 594
Table 4.5: Baseline Passenger Mix
It should be noted that the two alliance partners have asymmetric networks and differ in
their characteristics and passenger mix. AL 4 is bigger than AL 2 in terms of RPMs by
26%. AL 4 has a higher proportion of connecting traffic while AL 2 has a higher
proportion of local traffic. As a proportion of the total traffic, codeshares form 16.3% for
AL 2 and 14.9% for AL 4.
The breakup of revenues into local, connection and own codeshare (pre resolution)
components is shown in Figure 4.6 for the alliance carriers. For the combined alliance,
codeshares account for 25.2% of total revenues while occupying only 8.4% of total traffic
by passengers. Most of the codeshare paths have high fares because they involve long
distance international flights. Thus, the codeshare traffic is highly valuable in terms of
revenue per passenger in this network. However, the biggest revenue component is
connection revenue for both the partners, more prominently for AL 4.
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Figure 4.6: Baseline Revenue Components
Let us take a look at the baseline fare class mix of the different traffic components.
Figure 4.7 shows the class 1 to class 6 bookings for AL 2 on the aggregate level i.e.
summed over its whole network. A higher number of bookings in top classes lead to a
higher revenue which is targeted by different revenue management techniques. We will
compare this baseline fare class mix with that obtained in our upcoming experiments to
gain useful insights.
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Figure 4.7: Baseline Fare Class Mix of AL 2
Now that we have defined the baseline case, we will proceed to the experimental analysis
and results. It should be noticed that throughout this chapter, in all the experiments
both alliance carriers use same set of methods for forecasting, seat allocation, codeshare
valuation and availability control. The changes are made simultaneously for both the
partners and there is no asymmetry with regard to their revenue management systems.
All the results are shown on the aggregate level which includes the complete network of
each airline.
4.3 Sub-optimality of O-D Control in
Alliances
We start our analysis by looking at the impacts of codeshare traffic on the revenue
management in alliances. The presence of codeshare traffic becomes a limitation while
optimizing the revenues using O-D control methods. O-D control depends on calculating
the network contribution of each passenger itinerary in an airline's network and requires
fare valuations as inputs for calculations. These inputs are straightforward in the case of
local and connecting paths. In the case of a codeshare path part of the itinerary lies
outside an airline's network. Thus the valuation input to the airline's O-D optimizer is
not simple and can take different values as discussed in the section 3.3. Any fixed and
arbitrary valuation of codeshares like local valuation, Y-Prorate valuation and total
valuation does not provide optimal revenues for the alliance. This can be verified in the
results shown in Figure 4.8. The results come from the comparisons shown in Table 4.6:
AL2 AL4
Comparison AL 1 AL 3
2 EMSRb/DAVN EMSRb AT 90 EMSRb
Table 4.6: Experimental Set-up for O-D Control Comparisons
The percentage gains from using O-D control over leg based EMSRb are shown for the
alliance carriers and AL 1 which competes with the alliance carriers on all routes. The
"ALLIANCE" calculations use a sum of the revenues of the two partners.
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Figure 4.8: Revenue Gains from O-D Control
The typical revenue gains obtained from using O-D control by network carriers lie in the
range of 1.0% to 1.8%. AL 1 here gains 1.17% while the combined alliance revenues
IDAVNI
-0.68%
increase by 0.49% only. It is clear that due to the presence of codeshare traffic and its
non-optimal valuation (local fare inputs in this case), the revenue gain for alliance from
implementing DAVN on two separate parts of the network is less than half of the gain
achieved individually by AL 1. It is not sure that the optimal revenue gains for alliance
would be exactly equal to 1.17%, but it would certainly lie in that range. Also there is a
difference between the two alliance carriers which is attributed to the network
asymmetry and codeshare revenue resolution scheme. As mentioned earlier in the last
section, the networks of two airlines are asymmetric. The individual revenue gains can
change under different codeshare revenue resolution schemes.
The above result also point out the motivation of this study i.e. to reduce the sub-
optimality in revenue gains created by the presence of codeshare traffic.
4.4 Impacts of AVS and Cascading
Cascading is the first step towards reducing the sub-optimality in revenue gains. As we
have discussed in section 3.1, cascading allows the alliance carriers to record & forecast
the codeshare bookings separately from locals.
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Figure 4.9: AVS vs. Cascading: Comparison of Revenue Gains
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Figure 4.9 compares the gains of using O-D control (DAVN and ProBP) with AVS and
cascading. In each experiment related to Figure 4.9, both alliance carriers use the same
O-D control method and same method for recording & forecasting. The relative gains are
shown with respect to the revenues in the baseline case.
There are two key results shown in Figure 4.9: (i) the gains of using DAVN and ProBP
over EMSRb for the alliance carriers, (ii) the benefits of using cascading over AVS. The
gains of using DAVN over EMSRb are in the range of 0.50% to 0.70%. Gains with
ProBP are higher, since ProBP is a probabilistic method based on optimal proration.
There are small benefits of using cascading over AVS, close to 0.1% in this network.
These are direct gains of cascading over AVS which come from separating the local and
codeshare bookings and thus improving the forecast which is used by the optimizer. To
take a closer look, we first compare the change in aggregate revenue components of AL 2,
relative to the baseline values and pre codeshare revenue resolution, for the two methods.
$25,000 ~ DAVN AVS
g $20,OOO - M CASCADING
c
U $15,000
$10,000
S$5,000
$0
-$5,000
LOC CONX CS
Revenue Component
Figure 4.10: Changes in Revenue Components of AL 2
The first observation in Figure 4.10 is that compared to baseline which uses leg based
control, the O-D control methods improve revenues (sub-optimally) in alliances through
increasing the connecting revenues in large proportions while compromising the codeshare
revenues in a lesser amount. The aggregate local revenues are not affected a lot. This is
true for both AVS and Cascading. The slightly better performance of cascading comes
through a lower reduction in codeshare revenues and a slight increase in local revenues.
Figure 4.11 shows the relative changes in fare class mix of codeshare traffic for AL 2, as
compared to the baseline numbers. It considers the aggregate codeshare bookings
accepted by AL 2 on all of its legs. On the x axis, fare classes go from 1 to 6 with 1 being
the highest fare. With O-D control both AVS and cascading reduce the codeshare traffic
in the lower classes and increase it in the higher classes. It should be noted that the
changes in the plot which appear small are actually substantial in the case of codeshare
traffic which by itself is quite small as shown in table 4.5. These changes go up to 12%
when compared to the baseline codeshare traffic.
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Figure 4.11: Changes in Codeshare Fare Class Mix of AL 2
It should be realized that in a network, the effects of AVS and cascading are not limited
to codeshare traffic. The local and connecting traffic components are also affected
because each codeshare booking can potentially replace either a local or a connecting
passenger on a leg. Figure 4.12 shows the relative changes in fare class mix of local traffic
for AL 2. The numbers shown in boxes are the bookings made in cascading relative to
those made in AVS. It shows that with an improved forecast cascading leads to an
improved fare class mix with more bookings in higher classes and fewer bookings in lower
classes and thus higher revenues. Similar is the case of connecting fare class mix as
shown in Figure 4.13, except that the reduction is class 6 is very large.
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Figure 4.12: Changes in Local Fare Class Mix of AL 2
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The above discusses the direct gains of using cascading over AVS. The indirect benefits
of cascading are much more important because it provides the ability to use different
techniques in the later steps of revenue management which includes alternative valuation
schemes other than local valuation, bid price sharing control in availability and dynamic
valuation in the optimizer.
4.5 Impacts of Codeshare Valuation Schemes
We evaluate three static codeshare valuation schemes: Local, Y-Prorate and Total
valuation. These have been described in detail in section 3.3. The baseline case uses local
valuation while O-D control and cascading are prerequisites to test alternative codeshare
valuation schemes. The alliance partners use the same valuation scheme in each case and
the experiments are made in the DAVN and ProBP environments separately.
1.2% DAVN ProBP -LOCAL
MlY-PRO
1.0% - ETOTAL
0.8%
0.6%
' 0.4%
0.2%
0.0%
AL 2 AL 4 ALLIANCE AL 2 AL 4 ALLIANCE
Figure 4.14: Valuation Schemes: Comparison of Revenue Gains
It is found that, of the three schemes, total valuation scheme performs best in this
network (see Figure 4.14). The network characteristics of alliance carriers are such that
the codeshare bookings are highly valuable. Codeshares represent 25.2% of total alliance
revenues with just an 8.4% of total traffic in the baseline case. The total valuation
overvalues codeshares and hence takes more codeshare bookings than the other two
valuation schemes.
The Y-Prorate valuation scheme values the codeshare bookings at a lower value than
both local and total valuation schemes and hence takes fewer codeshare bookings. Figure
4.15 compares the fare class mix of codeshare traffic in these three valuation schemes
relative to the baseline codeshare traffic for AL 2. Y-Prorate reduces the number of
codeshare bookings across all the fare classes while this number goes up heavily in the
case of total valuation.
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Figure 4.15: Changes in Codeshare Traffic Mix of AL 2
The changes in revenue components, before codeshare revenue resolution, relative to
baseline are shown for AL 2 in the Figure 4.16. As expected, the total valuation has the
highest codeshare revenues while the Y-Prorate has the lowest. Since there is a tradeoff
between different traffic components, therefore increase in connecting revenues is least for
total valuation while it is highest for Y-Prorate.
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Figure 4.16: Changes in Revenue Components of AL 2
It is interesting to see that the revenue components and traffic mix are very different for
the three valuation schemes. Especially in the case of local and Y-Prorate valuation
schemes where the overall revenues are not very different because the effects on revenue
components offset each other in this particular network (A4). In a different network
setting, the revenue difference between the two can easily become large, particularly in
networks with a larger amount of codeshare traffic. From the point of view of an airline
or alliance, the use of a particular static valuation scheme depends on their network
characteristics and system capabilities. A particular scheme can be better in one case
while worse in the other.
4.6 Impacts of Availability Control
The two methods of availability control: standard control and availability control using
bid price sharing are analyzed in this section. The latter requires O-D seat allocation
control, cascading and bid price sharing between alliance partners as prerequisites. The
results here are different with the two seat allocation optimizers, DAVN and ProBP, and
are discussed separately under two subsections.
4.6.1 Impacts of Availability Control in DAVN
Bid price sharing control does not change the static codeshare valuation used in the
optimizer but acts only in the later step of availability control. To test the impacts of
availability control in DAVN, we first test the two methods under local valuation
scheme. Figure 4.17 shows the substantial benefit derived from using bid price sharing
control over standard method for the alliance.
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Figure 4.17: Revenue Gains of AL 2 under Local Valuation
The benefits of bid price sharing for DAVN come from better codeshare availability
decisions taking into account the status of partner's codeshare legs and achieving a better
fare class mix. To take a closer look, we first compare the change in aggregate revenue
components of AL 2, relative to the baseline values and pre codeshare revenue resolution,
for the two availability control methods.
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Figure 4.18: Changes in Revenue Components of AL 2
The codeshare revenues increase significantly after using the bid price sharing control.
The connecting revenues go down relatively but in a lower amount leading to a
substantial increase in overall gains. The bid price sharing control brings a large increase
in the codeshare revenues through an improvement in the fare class mix which is
achieved through a better seat availability control. Figure 4.19 illustrates this fact
comparing the fare class mix of aggregate codeshare traffic (own) for AL 2 under the
local valuation scheme. The number of class 5 bookings goes down with bid price sharing
control and those seats are used to book passengers in higher classes. The numbers shown
in the boxes are bookings for bid price sharing relative to those for the standard control.
For example in fare class 5, bid price sharing has 6.8 fewer bookings compared to the
standard control. Again, these small changes are substantial in the case of codeshare
traffic and the results are shown on the aggregate level.
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Figure 4.19: Changes in Codeshare Traffic Mix of AL 2
After analyzing the impacts of availability control with local valuation, we will now add
the other two valuation schemes to the Figure 4.17 our plot to get a complete picture of
the impacts under the three valuation schemes, as shown in Figure 4.20.
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Figure 4.20: Revenue Gains with Bid Price Sharing Control in DAVN
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Figure 4.20 shows that the bid price sharing control increases the revenues substantially
for the local and Y-Prorate valuation schemes. It is interesting to see that there are no
significant revenue improvements by using bid price sharing control under total valuation
scheme. In fact, with bid price sharing control all the three valuation schemes perform at
par with each other.
Let us analyze the performance of availability control methods under total valuation.
With standard availability control, the number of codeshare bookings is very high
because of their over valuation. This over valuation also implies that the estimated bid
prices on the codeshare legs are also higher. Figure 4.21 shows the average shadow prices,
averaged over all the flight legs of AL 2, for the 16 time frames of the booking period.
The difference between the values of local valuation and total valuation is smaller in
DAVN as compared to that in ProBP which is shown in Figure 4.22. The impact of over
valuation of codeshares under total valuation is visible in Figure 4.22 in terms of higher
average bid prices. The impact is diluted when averaged over whole network though. It
would be prominent for individual flight legs like NRT-ORD, flown by AL 4 into the AL
2 hub (see figure 4.3), which carries high amount of codeshare traffic.
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Figure 4.21: Average Shadow Prices of AL 2
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Figure 4.22: Average Bid Prices of AL 2
These bid prices are then shipped to the partner who uses them for the accept/reject
decision for a codeshare booking request as explained in the section 3.4. For example
consider the acceptance rule for bid price sharing control for DAVN stated in equation
3.20:
T - Pt > EMSRtWn
Thus, higher are the partner's bid prices (or shadow prices in the case of DAVN), lesser
is the acceptance rate of codeshare bookings. This is what happens in the bid price
sharing control under total valuation. With bid price sharing control under total
valuation, codeshare bookings are rather rejected in class 5 and 6 (see Figure 4.23), due
to a higher value of bid prices shipped by the partner. They are replaced by the
connecting traffic instead leading to a rise in connecting revenues. It is interesting to
notice that the revenue components are very different for the local and total valuation
schemes under the standard method while they approach each other closely under the bid
price sharing control (see the two lines in Figure 4.24).
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Figure 4.23: Changes in Codeshare Traffic Mix of AL 2
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Figure 4.24: Changes in Revenue Components of AL 2
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4.6.2 Impacts of Availability Control in ProBP
ProBP is an algorithm based explicitly on iterative proration of fares of the connecting
itineraries along the legs they traverse to reflect the network contribution (see section
3.2.2.2). The proration is different for different itineraries in the network and is also
different in different time frames of the booking period for the same itinerary. It is an
optimal solution which accounts for the current network conditions and stochastic nature
of the demand.
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Figure 4.25: Revenue Gains with Bid Price Sharing Control in ProBP
ProBP behaves in a different manner than DAVN with bid price sharing control. Figure
4.25 compares the two availability control methods for ProBP under different valuation
schemes. The benefits of bid price sharing control are less here, unlike DAVN which has
gained substantially using it with the local and Y-Prorate valuation schemes. The reason
for this lies in the underlying differences in the algorithms of these two seat allocation
optimizers. In DAVN, the bid price sharing control involves nested booking limits which
make it more robust and it becomes more resistant to making any wrong decisions due to
some static, non-optimal valuation scheme used during the optimization. On the other
hand, ProBP relies on the right proration of fares of the connecting and codeshare
itineraries to calculate bid prices. Imperfect inputs (in terms of codeshares valuation)
result in a distortion of bid prices as it will be shown in Chapter 5. It is found that the
fare inputs have a dominating impact on the final performance of ProBP, irrespective of
the method of availability control used. This issue will be further addressed in Chapter 5
under the dynamic valuation scheme.
Let's take a look at the plot of revenue components under ProBP in Figure 4.26. The
relative order (like bid price sharing control increases codeshare revenues for local
valuation and decreases it for total valuation) remains the same as in DAVN for both
local and total valuation schemes.
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Figure 4.26: Changes in Revenue Components of AL 2
In the case of local valuation the benefits of bid price sharing are not substantial because
the increase in codeshare revenues is smaller than what is realized under DAVN. To
substantiate this finding, we plot the fare class mix of codeshare traffic under local
valuation scheme in Figure 4.27. It is clear that unlike in DAVN, the improvement in
fare class is less prominent here. There is a decrease in traffic in both class 5 and 6 while
the increase in traffic in higher classes is not comparable. More importantly, the traffic in
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top fare class- class 1 also goes down with bid price sharing. Thus, the increase in
codeshare revenues is restrained to a smaller value in the ProBP environment.
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Figure 4.27: Changes in Codeshare Traffic Mix of AL 2
4.7 Evolution of Revenues
As a summary of the results shown in this chapter, plots of the evolution of total
revenues and different revenue components are provided. Figures 4.28 to 4.31 are the
revenue plots for AL 2 where the horizontal axis shows the different experimental
scenarios and the vertical axis shows the change in revenues relative to the baseline
values. Note that in all these scenarios AL 2 and AL 4 use O-D control while in the
baseline they both use EMSRb. The first scenario uses AVS while all other scenarios use
cascading. The middle three scenarios represent the three static valuation schemes. The
last three scenarios represent changing the availability control method to bid price
sharing control from standard control which is used by the first four scenarios.
It is clear from Figure 4.28 that all the scenarios (using O-D control) perform better than
the baseline. Both total valuation scheme and bid price sharing control lead to highest
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increase in revenues in DAVN. The pattern is same for ProBP except for the scenarios
involving bid price sharing control.
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Figure 4.28: Evolution of Changes in Total Revenues of AL 2
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Figure 4.29: Evolution of Changes in Codeshare Revenues of AL 2
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The codeshare revenue component decreases with AVS, cascading with local valuation
and cascading with Y-Prorate valuation as shown in Figure 4.29. The reduction is
highest with Y-Prorate valuation due to its lowest valuation of codeshare bookings. The
codeshare revenues rather increase under cascading with total valuation and bid price
sharing control. Since the three revenue components are not independent and there is a
tradeoff between each of them, it can be seen in Figure 4.30 that the increase in
connecting revenues is inversely related to the gains in codeshare revenues of Figure 4.29.
Lastly, the local revenues are not affected much overall and its changes are quite small
(see Figure 4.31) as compared to the other two revenue components, though the fare
class mix is certainly different under different cases.
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Figure 4.30: Evolution of Changes in Connection Revenues of AL 2
103
$25,000 -
4$20,000 - DAVN 
ProBP
$15,000 -
.i $10,000 -
3
.S $5,000 -
0 $0
-(A
: -$5,000 - -
-$10,000 - U U U co U 5 U
-$15,000 -
Figure 4.31: Evolution of Changes in Local Revenues of AL 2
4.8 Chapter Summary
The different techniques under each of the four dimensions of airline revenue
management are tested in this chapter. The simulation tool- PODS and the simulation
environment- alliance network A4 are introduced in the beginning of the chapter. The
sub-optimality of revenue management in alliances due to the presence of codeshare
traffic is illustrated. In an alliance, compared to the gains for individual airline networks,
the gains with O-D RM control are lower by 0.6%-0.8 % due to the arbitrary and fixed
valuation of codeshares used in the optimizer.
The direct benefits of cascading over AVS are shown where cascading benefits marginally
over AVS in the range of 0.1% by separating the codeshares from locals and improving
the forecast. The results for the three static codeshare valuation schemes are compared.
It is found that compared to local valuation, the codeshare traffic increases significantly
in the case of total valuation while it goes down heavily in Y-Prorate valuation (static
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proration). Since there is a tradeoff between different traffic components, the local and
connecting traffic gets replaced by codeshares in total valuation while they increase in
the case of Y-Prorate valuation. None of these static valuation schemes are optimal and
one can outperform the other in terms of overall alliance revenues depending on the
network structure of the alliance partners. In the current setting of Network A4, the
codeshare traffic is highly valuable in terms of revenue per passenger resulting in higher
overall revenues with total valuation. Compared to local and Y-Prorate valuation, the
revenues are higher for total valuation in the range of +0.2% to +0.4%.
The bid price sharing control for availability affects DAVN and ProBP in a different
manner. DAVN benefits substantially from it through improving the codeshare fare class
mix and hence the revenues. The incremental revenue gains compared to standard
availability control lies in the range of 0.2% to 0.3%. This is true for local and Y-Prorate
valuation schemes while total valuation benefits only marginally using the bid price
sharing control.
In ProBP environment, the incremental revenue gains from using bid price sharing
control are marginal in the range of 0.05%. This is because the rise in codeshare revenue
component is much lower in ProBP as compared to that in DAVN. The underlying
reason is that bid price sharing control uses the static valuation schemes which feed
arbitrary and fixed fare inputs to the optimizer. Performance of ProBP is dominated by
fare inputs because it relies on the optimal proration of itinerary fares over the traversed
legs.
The next chapter will introduce a new valuation scheme called dynamic valuation scheme
which substantially benefits both DAVN and ProBP.
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5. Chapter 5
Dynamic Valuation Scheme for
Codeshare Paths
This chapter introduces a new valuation scheme for codeshare paths called dynamic
valuation. The first section describes its formulation while the successive sections discuss
the PODS simulation results of its implementation. A detailed and comparative analysis
is made with the static valuation schemes as well as with the techniques of bid price
sharing control, which have been discussed previously in Chapter 3. The challenges and
risks involved in implementing dynamic valuation are also discussed.
5.1 Introduction
Dynamic valuation is an attempt to develop a valuation scheme for codeshare paths
which will allow an airline to account for the information of its partner's legs in its own
optimizer. It requires sharing of bid prices between partners in order to calculate the
valuation of codeshare paths. The motivation behind dynamic valuation is to use the
information available in terms of partner's bid prices to find an optimal valuation of the
codeshare paths and use it in one's own optimizer. It recognizes the fact that every
codeshare itinerary consists of two or more legs and the "alliance network contribution"
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of an airline's codeshare leg depends on the opportunity cost of occupying a seat on the
partner's codeshare leg. This opportunity cost has no fixed value and depends on the
demands of paths which traverse the partner's leg and other network conditions. This
dependence cannot be incorporated in the optimizer with any of the static valuation
schemes which were considered in Chapter 3. Even the technique of bid price sharing
control accounts for the information of partner's legs during the later step of availability
control only and does not use it in the optimizer. Figure 5.1, a modification of Figure 3.2,
shows this distinction by locating the points of action of dynamic valuation (in the
optimizer) and bid price sharing control (in the availability control).
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Figure 5.1: Dynamic Valuation vs. Bid Price Sharing Control
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Dynamic valuation in the optimizer is an effort to estimate the actual contribution of a
codeshare booking for the alliance. There can be several different ways of achieving this.
One can use a difference of total O-D fare and partner's bid price or a proration of total
O-D fare based on own and partner's bid prices. This thesis uses the difference technique
which is formulated in equation 5.1 and 5.2:
If the partner is using DAVN, dynamic valuation of a codeshare path in time frame1 t is
given by:
n= T - SPartner (5.1)
If the partner is using ProBP, dynamic valuation of a codeshare path in time frame t is
given by:
n= T - ptner (5.2)
where,
Dt = Dynamic valuation used in own optimizer in current time frame t
SPt = Shadow Price on partner's codeshare leg in previous time frame t - 1
BP$$tner = Bid price on partner's codeshare leg in pervious time frame t - 1
T = Total fare for the codeshare path
To understand this formulation clearly, we will extend the example provided in section
3.4.1. Table 5.1 reiterates the Q class fare structure used in that example and adds the
column of shadow prices, from the previous time frame, which are evaluated using
dynamic valuation in the optimizer. The codeshare request under consideration is LAX-
FRA/Q class, a two leg itinerary, LAX-ORD being operated by partner 1 and ORD-FRA
being operated by partner 2 in the alliance as illustrated in Figure 5.2. Here both
partners are using DAVN as the seat allocation optimizer. Four different valuation
I One time frame is the period between two consecutive runs of the seat allocation optimizer.
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estimates, which include the three static valuation schemes (discussed in Chapter 3) and
dynamic valuation, are illustrated separately in table 5.2.
LAX
Figure 5.2: Illustration: Codeshare Path LAX-FRA
Table 5.1: Fares (Q class) for Local and Codeshare Paths
Airline Valuation
P1 $248
P2 $ 532
(a) Local Fare Valuation
Airline Valuation
P1 $619
P2 $619
Airline Valuation
P1 $ 206.33
P2 $ 412.67
(b) Y-Prorate Valuation (1:2)
Airline Valuation
P1 $619- SP2
P2 $619- SP1
(c) Total Fare Valuation (d) Dynamic Valuation
Table 5.2: Codeshare Valuations used in Optimizer
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Partner 1: Dynamic Valuation
$1350 $ V1
$1000 $ V2
$700 $ V3
$480 V4
$350 \ $ V5
$250 $ V6
$180 $ V7
$100 $ V8
Figure 5.3: Effects of Local Fare Valuation vs. Codeshare Valuation
The difference between effects of local fare valuation and dynamic valuation of
codeshares used in partner l's optimizer is illustrated in Figure 5.3. With local fare
valuation scheme, partner 1 values the codeshare itinerary LAX-FRA/Q at its local fare
of $ 248. Similarly the other codeshare itineraries are valued at their local fares and
partner 1 runs the deterministic linear program (see DAVN, section 3.2.2.1) to calculate
the shadow prices of its legs and construct the nested virtual buckets, as shown in Figure
5.3. Further the LAX-FRA/Q is mapped to an appropriate virtual bucket based on its
local valuation of $ 248 and the itinerary is available for booking if this virtual bucket is
still open which is the case in Figure 5.3.
In the case of dynamic valuation, partner 1 uses the difference of total codeshare fare and
partner 2's bid price on ORD-FRA leg, in order to calculate the valuation of LAX-
FRA/Q (Figure 5.3). Thus the valuation may change in each time frame depending on
the conditions of ORD-FRA leg of partner 2. For a given set of fare values, if the
demands of paths traversing this leg are low, then its bid price is relatively low. This will
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Partner 1: Local Valuation
result in a higher valuation of the codeshare path LAX-FRA/Q by partner 1 in its
optimizer and vice versa.
For a given set of bid prices of partner 2's codeshare legs and upon its sharing, partner 1
calculates the dynamic valuation of codeshare paths and then runs the deterministic
linear program to calculate the shadow prices and construct the nested virtual buckets.
Note that the bucket fare ranges will be different in this case than local valuation and
will depend on the set of values used in dynamic valuation. Further, the codeshare
itinerary LAX-FRA/Q is mapped to an appropriate virtual bucket based on its dynamic
valuation and it remains available for booking if that assigned virtual bucket is still open,
as shown in Figure 5.3.
5.2 Revenue Sharing and Sum of Airlines'
Codeshare Valuations
The process of sharing revenues, obtained from codeshare bookings, among the alliance
partners is called revenue sharing. It is commonly handled through a contractual
agreement between alliance carriers. It should allow for a fair distribution between them
and provide incentives to pursue a strategy which is optimal for the combined alliance
rather than just own airline. The revenue to be shared is the total fare received from a
codeshare passenger while the airlines value this passenger, in their own optimizer, as per
the codeshare valuation scheme being used by them. We will compare the total fare with
sum of airlines' codeshare valuations under different schemes and see how dynamic
valuation can provide a basis for developing a fair revenue sharing scheme.
Sum of airlines' codeshare valuations is defined as sum of the valuations of a codeshare
path used by alliance partners in their own optimizers. In Chapter 3 (section 3.3), we
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have seen equations for the sum of airlines' codeshare valuations for each static valuation
scheme. Equation 5.3 states the order followed by static schemes with regard to the value
placed by an airline on a codeshare path:
Total Valuation Local Valuation , Y Prorate Valuation (5.3)
In fact, this is also the order with regard to the sum of airlines' codeshare valuations. In
the total valuation scheme, both partners value the codeshare path in their optimizers at
its total fare and thus the sum of valuations is twice the total fare. Whereas in the local
valuation scheme both partners value the codeshare path at the local fares of the
corresponding legs traversed by the codeshare path. The sum of local fares is always less
than or equal to twice the total fare and hence the sum of valuations in total valuation.
However, the sum of local fares on any two flight legs is usually greater than a
connecting or codeshare fare which traverses those two legs. Thus, the sum of valuations
under local valuation scheme is greater than or equal to that in Y-Prorate valuation in
which the valuations sum-up exactly to the total fare.
Now let us evaluate the sum of airlines' codeshare valuations under the dynamic
valuation scheme. Consider an alliance involving two partners, both using ProBP. The
total amount in dynamic valuation is the sum of the two valuations used by the partners
and is given by equation 5.4. For a codeshare booking request, partner 1 can accept the
booking only if it satisfies equation 5.5. Similarly, partner 2 can accept a codeshare
booking request provided that it satisfies equation 5.6. The parameters S1 and 62
represent the alliance revenue surplus which is the amount by which the dynamic
valuation of a codeshare booking exceeds the leg bid price of that airline. In the case of a
lag of one time frame it is different for a booking made by each airline.
(T - BPit-1) + (T - BPEt-1) (5.4)
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81 = (T - BP2-') - BPj 0 (5.5)
62 = (T - BPf') - BP2 0 (5.6)
where,
T = Total fare for the codeshare path
BP| = Bid Price of partner i's codeshare leg in time frame j
6i = Alliance revenue surplus for a codeshare booking accepted by partner i
Assuming that the bid prices are approximately the same in the two consecutive time
frames (for partner 1 or 2), as stated in equation 5.7 for partner 1, the sum defined
previously by equation 5.4 becomes T + 61 as shown in equation 5.8.
BP,-' BPf (5.7)
(T - BPJ') + (T - BP,-') - (T - BPE~1) + (T - BPf) = T + 1  (5.8)
In the case of real time bid price sharing between partners, the approximation in
equation 5.7 is not needed. Then the two parameters Si and 62 representing revenue
surplus become equal and the relationship in equation 5.8 holds exactly.
Thus, from equation 5.8, dynamic valuation can exceed the total available fare by a
value equal to revenue surplus which is greater than or equal to zero. This can provide a
basis for further research on revenue sharing between alliance partners. The operating
carrier of a codeshare leg must receive at least the bid price of that leg from the
marketing carrier and the revenue surplus can be further divided in a ratio mutually
agreed upon. This ratio may depend on bid prices of the codeshare legs involved.
Note that in the case of bid price sharing control in the availability, the sum of airlines'
codeshare valuations is dependent on the valuation schemes used by partners in their
optimizers and is not affected by the bid price sharing mechanism which acts in the later
stage of availability control as shown in Figure 5.1. Thus, it can be greater than that of
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dynamic valuation in the cases of local and total valuation schemes while equal to or
slightly lower than that of dynamic valuation in the case of Y-Prorate valuation.
5.3 PODS Simulation Results
This section presents the PODS simulation results for dynamic valuation scheme. The
simulation setup remains the same as described in Chapter 4 (section 4.2). We will focus
on the performance of alliance partners, i.e. AL 2 and AL 4 and will compare it with the
baseline statistics presented in section 4.2. It should be kept in mind that cascading, O-D
control and bid price sharing (as described in Chapter 3) are important prerequisites for
dynamic valuation. We present the dynamic valuation results for the two O-D seat
allocation optimizers, DAVN and ProBP under separate sections.
5.3.1 Dynamic Valuation in DAVN Environment
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Figure 5.4: Revenue Gains with Different Valuation Schemes
If both partners are using DAVN, they share the shadow prices on their codeshare legs
with each other and use equation 5.1 to calculate the dynamic valuation inputs of
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codeshare paths. In Figure 5.4, we compare the revenue gains relative to the baseline for
the three static valuation schemes and dynamic valuation scheme. It is observed that the
dynamic valuation yields substantially higher gains compared to the local and Y-Prorate
valuation schemes. The gain for total valuation is close to that of dynamic valuation.
Figure 5.5 compares the revenue components of these four schemes for Airline 2.
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Figure 5.5: Changes in Revenue Components of Airline 2
Dynamic valuation increases both codeshare revenues and connecting revenues compared
to the baseline which lead to a substantial increase in overall revenues. Compared to
total valuation, the rise in codeshare revenues is smaller while the rise in connecting
revenues is larger. Unlike total valuation, dynamic valuation does not increase the total
number of codeshare bookings relative to the baseline. The gain in codeshare revenues
rather comes from the improved fare class mix as shown in Figure 5.6. Also in the case of
connecting and the local traffic components, the fare class mix improves with dynamic
valuation (Figure 5.7 and 5.8). Thus in spite of a lower amount of traffic, the overall
revenues go up in dynamic valuation.
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Figure 5.6: Changes in Codeshare Traffic Mix of Airline 2 (different scale)
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Figure 5.8: Changes in Connecting Traffic Mix of Airline 2
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5.3.2 Dynamic Valuation in ProBP Environment
If both partners are using ProBP, they share the bid prices on their codeshare legs with
each other and use equation 5.2 to calculate the dynamic valuation inputs of codeshare
paths. It is observed in Figure 5.9 that, in the same manner as in DAVN, dynamic
valuation yields substantially higher gains compared to the local and Y-Prorate valuation
schemes. The absolute numbers are larger in the case of ProBP compared to DAVN. The
gain for total valuation is again close to that of dynamic valuation but the traffic mix is
quite different under the two schemes as explained through Figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.9: Revenue Gains with Different Valuation Schemes
Figure 5.10 provides a deeper insight by comparing the individual revenue components
for Airline 2 under the four valuation schemes. It is observed that all the three revenue
components go up in dynamic valuation. The only other scheme which exhibits this
property is total valuation, Compared to total valuation, the rise in the codeshare
revenues is lower but the rise in local and connecting revenues is higher with dynamic
valuation. This is because total valuation overvalues the codeshare traffic and takes
much more codeshare bookings (see section 4.5) than in dynamic valuation. In fact, the
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total number of bookings goes down in dynamic valuation relative to the baseline. The
rise in revenues comes through the improved fare class mix as shown in Figure 5.11.
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Figure 5.10: Changes in Revenue Components of Airline 2
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Figure 5.11: Changes in Codeshare Traffic Mix of Airline 2 (different scale)
In ProBP, the changes in codeshare fare class mix due to dynamic valuation are similar
to those in DAVN. However, the local and connecting traffic behave in a little different
manner (Figure 5.12 and 5.13). Unlike DAVN, ProBP cuts down heavily on class 6
connecting traffic while replacing it with an increase in class 6 local traffic. This may
happen due to higher bid prices of certain legs in the airline's network.
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Figure 5.13: Changes in Connecting Traffic Mix of Airline 2
5.4 Comparison of Dynamic Valuation with
Bid Price Sharing Control
Both dynamic valuation in the optimizer and bid price sharing control in the availability
are similar in that they require the alliance partners to share bid prices (or shadow
prices) of codeshare legs between each other. However, there are key differences between
the two in the use of these shared bid prices. Bid price sharing control uses the partner's
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bid prices in the last but one step of availability control. The seat allocation optimizer
still uses the arbitrary and fixed valuation inputs for codeshare paths i.e. local, Y-Prorate
or total valuation, while in the case of dynamic valuation the information of partner's bid
prices is used in the seat optimizer itself. Figure 5.14 shows a matrix of the use of bid
prices during the two different steps of valuation and availability under dynamic
valuation and bid price sharing control.
Partner s None
own and
Partner's
Figure 5.14: Bid Prices in Dynamic Valuation and Bid Price Sharing Control
In the case of dynamic valuation, partner's bid prices from previous time frame are used
for the valuation of codeshares using equations 5.1 and 5.2. Thus the codeshare valuation
may change in each time frame depending on the partner's bid prices. In the availability
step, dynamic valuation just uses its own bid price and thus executes standard
availability control while bid price sharing control uses both own and partner's bid
prices. Thus dynamic valuation is theoretically more sound than bid price sharing control
because it accounts for the opportunity cost of partner's leg in the valuation step itself
and hence helps the airline in estimating optimal bid prices. The bid price sharing control
leads to distorted bid prices because it does not fix the valuation step when own bid
prices are calculated. More significantly, it affects the combined alliance in two ways-
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not only own bid prices get distorted, but also it affects the partner when the own bid
prices are shared and used for valuation or availability control by the partner. Thus it is
critical to fix the valuation step and provide the correct valuation inputs to the seat
allocation optimizer. This becomes evident from the poor performance of ProBP with bid
price sharing control as shown in Figure 5.15. This impact can be overcome in more
robust algorithms like DAVN in which bid price sharing control in availability performs
as good as dynamic valuation in the optimizer.
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Figure 5.15: Revenue Gains with Dynamic Valuation and Bid Price
Sharing Control
Figure 5.15 shows that the revenue gains with dynamic valuation are close to bid price
sharing control in DAVN environment. In contrast to this, the revenue gains are
substantially higher with dynamic valuation than bid price sharing control in ProBP
environment. In addition, ProBP with dynamic valuation generates even higher revenue
gains than DAVN thus keeping the order consistent across all valuation schemes. As
discussed in section 3.2.2, DAVN is an algorithm which uses deterministic shadow prices
for mapping fare classes into the appropriate virtual buckets and uses EMSRb heuristic
on top of that to calculate the nested booking limits. This framework creates robustness
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in DAVN and reduces its sensitivity to the fare inputs used in the optimizer. This results
in similar gains of dynamic valuation and bid price sharing control in DAVN
environment. On the other hand, ProBP is an algorithm based on the optimal proration
of total fares over the traversed legs. The valuation inputs affect the bid prices
calculations and have a dominating impact in ProBP. To get a deeper insight into this,
let us compare the average bid prices of AL 2 with dynamic valuation and bid price
sharing control (Figure 5.16 and 5.17). The valuation inputs used with bid price sharing
control are static local fare inputs while the dynamic valuation inputs change in every
time frame.
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Figure 5.16: Average Shadow Prices in DAVN
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Figure 5.17: Average Bid Prices in ProBP
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It is observed that the average shadow prices are not very different in DAVN
environment, while there is a marked difference between the bid prices in ProBP
environment. In ProBP, the bid prices are higher with dynamic valuation compared to
bid price sharing control except in the first time frame. The distortion of bid prices under
bid price sharing control leads to lower gains compared to those with dynamic valuation.
It should be noted that the curves in Figure 5.16 and 5.17 show bid prices averaged over
all the legs in the network and the difference will be larger on legs which carry a high
proportion of codeshare traffic.
5.5 Implementation of Dynamic Valuation:
Challenges and Risks
The implementation and use of dynamic valuation at airlines will depend on their needs,
capabilities and revenue sharing agreements. Dynamic valuation requires the following
three key techniques of revenue management as prerequisites. Each of them requires
additional efforts and costs on part of the alliance carriers as explained below:
oo Cascading: It is required for separating codeshare bookings from local bookings in
the historical database and then forecasting the demand for the two separately.
Cascading is dependent on the degree of information sharing between alliance
carriers and requires information of the full codeshare itinerary booked by the
partners. The common challenges in this regard include insufficient technical
capabilities at airlines, incompatibilities among different bookings reservation
systems and Global Distribution Systems (GDS).
oo O-D Seat Allocation Control: In order to treat the codeshare itineraries
differently from local itineraries and also differently from each other, O-D control
or network revenue management for seat allocation is required. In addition,
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dynamic valuation requires O-D control to calculate the bid prices or shadow
prices on codeshare legs and share them with partner. O-D control is technically
advanced, complicated and expensive for airlines to implement. It requires
path/class forecasts and is more sensitive to the accuracy of inputs provided to
the optimizer. Currently, with the exception of several larger carriers in the
world, most of the airlines still use leg based RM control only.
oo Bid price sharing: It is required to gather information on partner's codeshare legs
and can be subjected to legal regulations. An antitrust immunity from concerned
regulatory authorities like Unites States Department of Justice and European
Union allows the airlines to share bid prices. Another issue is the frequency of
sharing bid prices. It can be real time, every time frame or with a lag of few time
frames. Darot (2001) also proposes a mechanism called bid price inference which
can guess the partner's bid prices on a codeshare leg using the lowest publicly
available fare on that leg. This can be useful to some extent in the case when bid
price sharing is not allowed.
An airline can face challenges on one or more of the above three technical fronts. It
would conduct a cost-benefit analysis of implementing dynamic valuation in their system.
For airlines with a smaller proportion of codeshare revenues, the gains from
implementing dynamic valuation may not justify the costs involved.
Apart from the technical issues, the codesharing and revenue sharing agreements can
become the biggest hurdles in implementing any alliance revenue management technique
like dynamic valuation. The codesharing agreement may entail sharing some minimum
seats on a leg and not allow optimal allocation of seats. In addition, the revenue sharing
agreement may be structured in a way such that in spite of dynamic valuation
benefitting the combined alliance, it hurts an individual airline. In that case the airline
will not implement the dynamic valuation and risk a loss of own revenues.
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5.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter describes a new valuation scheme for codeshare paths called dynamic
valuation. Dynamic valuation in the optimizer provides inputs which incorporate the
opportunity cost of occupying a seat on the partner's legs of codeshare paths by using
the information available through bid price sharing. It is based on calculating an
estimate of the actual contribution of a codeshare booking for the alliance. The difference
technique which uses the difference of the total O-D fare and partner's bid price is used
in this chapter to estimate the dynamic valuation of codeshare paths in the optimizer.
Unlike the static valuation schemes, the dynamic valuation may change in each time
frame depending on partner's bid prices from previous time frame.
The sum of airlines' codeshare valuations is solely dependent on the valuation scheme
used by alliance partners in their optimizers. It exceeds the total O-D fare in local and
total valuation schemes while it is exactly equal to the total O-D fare in Y-Prorate
valuation. In the case of dynamic valuation, it can exceed the total O-D fare by a value
equal to the revenue surplus which is greater than or equal to zero.
PODS simulation results of the implementation of dynamic valuation are presented and
explained for DAVN and ProBP environments separately in this chapter. In the network
A4 setting, it is found that dynamic valuation significantly improves the revenue gains
over the local and Y-Prorate valuations for both DAVN and ProBP. In DAVN, dynamic
valuation increases the codeshares and connections revenues compared to the baseline. It
improves the fare class mix of all the three traffic components, particularly codeshares,
thus leading to substantial revenue gains. In ProBP, the revenues go up in all the three
components compared to the baseline. It should be noted that the total number of
passengers carried is lower under dynamic valuation scheme compared to total valuation
scheme and baseline; the revenue gain is derived from an improved fare class mix instead.
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Both dynamic valuation in the optimizer and bid price sharing control in the availability
require sharing of bid prices between partners but they differ from each other in the
manner these shared bid prices are used. Bid price sharing control uses partner's bid
prices in the last but one step of availability control. The seat allocation optimizer still
uses the arbitrary and fixed valuation inputs while in the case of dynamic valuation the
information of partner's bid prices is used in the RM optimizer itself to dynamically
value the codeshare paths. Compared to bid price sharing control, the revenue gains with
dynamic valuation are similar in DAVN environment but they are significantly higher in
the case of ProBP. DAVN is based on a heuristic framework which makes it less accurate
but more robust than ProBP which is based on optimal proration of itinerary fares over
traversed legs.
Airlines that are using seat allocation algorithms which are less sensitive to valuation
inputs, like DAVN, can benefit substantially from using bid price sharing control in
availability which performs as good as using dynamic valuation in the optimizer. On the
other hand, algorithms which are based on estimation of optimal bid prices, like ProBP,
are more sensitive to valuation inputs. Airlines using such algorithms cannot benefit
much from using bid price sharing control in availability because it uses the static and
arbitrary valuation inputs in the optimizer, distorting the bid prices and resulting in
lower revenue gains. Dynamic valuation improves these valuation inputs provided to the
optimizer by estimating the actual contribution of a codeshare booking for the alliance
and hence leads to higher revenue gains. Due to the probabilistic nature of ProBP which
makes it more accurate, ProBP with dynamic valuation is able to yield higher revenue
gains than DAVN, which aligns with the typical order found with individual network
carriers.
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6. Chapter 6
Conclusion
Recalling from Chapter 1, the goal of this thesis is to first identify the challenges and
critical issues involved in revenue management for airline alliances and then propose
innovative and feasible solutions to increase revenue gains for the combined alliance. This
goal is achieved by analyzing the four key dimensions of the alliance revenue
management problem: recording & forecasting, seat allocation method or optimizer,
codeshare valuation in the optimizer and availability control of codeshare bookings. The
performances of different techniques, which are implemented in the industry or discussed
in the literature, are quantified using the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator
(PODS). A new valuation scheme called dynamic valuation is developed which is
found to yield significant revenue gains for both DAVN and ProBP, two common forms
of network revenue management. Section 6.1 summarizes all the findings of this thesis
with a brief supplementary discussion. Further, research contributions of this thesis are
presented in section 6.2 while the last section describes future research directions.
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6.1 Summary of Findings
The findings of this thesis are summarized under two headings. First, the challenges
involved in alliance revenue management in practice are discussed and then the
performance of different techniques in alliance revenue management is summarized.
Challenges involved in alliance revenue management in practice
Airline revenue management systems strive to maximize the revenue gains given an
inventory of seats and a fare structure. The existence of codeshare paths in airline
alliances presents challenges to the airline revenue management systems on many fronts,
from getting itinerary information to making an availability decision. All codeshare
itineraries (except in virtual codesharing) are unique in that they are connecting in
nature and only a part of the itinerary is carried on a flight operated by each alliance
partner. The recording & forecasting of codeshare bookings depends on the degree of
information (full or partial) received from the alliance partner. Recording & forecasting is
the first step in alliance revenue management which affects all further steps and can pose
serious limitations in terms of what techniques can be used to optimize the revenues. The
codeshare passengers can be recorded & forecasted only as local passengers' if the full
information of an itinerary booked by a partner is not available. Cascading, which
requires full itinerary information from the partner, is a prerequisite to use alternative
valuation schemes other than local fare valuation. It is also needed for using advanced
techniques for managing codeshare paths such as bid price sharing control in availability
and dynamic valuation in the optimizer.
I Local passengers are those whose origin-destination pair is the same as city pair of a flight leg
(refer section 1.2)
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The seat allocation methods become more critical in the context of airline alliances
compared to an individual airline's network. Together with cascading, O-D seat
allocation is necessary to provide a differential treatment to codeshare passengers from
local passengers. Also it is a necessity in order to distinguish between different codeshare
itineraries using the same flight leg. The two common O-D control methods are
Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting (DAVN) and Probabilistic Bid Pricing (ProBP).
DAVN is based on estimating the network revenue contribution of all itineraries using
deterministic linear programming. It then uses the EMSRb heuristic to estimate the
booking limits for the virtual buckets. This heuristic framework creates robustness in
DAVN which is less sensitive to fare inputs than ProBP. ProBP is more sensitive to fare
inputs because it relies on the optimal iterative proration of fares of all itineraries over
the traversed legs which means the valuation inputs used for codeshares is very
important for it. The valuation must take into account the stochastic nature of demand
in order to reach the optimal proration.
Codeshare valuation in the optimizer can affect the amount of codeshare demand
accepted and hence other traffic demands as well due to network effects. Static
approaches to valuation of codeshare paths remain constant throughout the booking
period and does not account for the stochastic nature of demand. Among the static
valuation schemes, both total fare valuation and local fare valuation overvalue the
codeshare bookings in that the sum of airlines' codeshare valuations exceed the total
codeshare fare while static prorate valuation sums up to the exact amount of codeshare
fare.
In estimating the actual contribution to the combined alliance network of accepting a
codeshare itinerary by an airline, the opportunity cost of occupying a seat on partner's
leg(s) needs to be accounted for. Here the challenge lies in getting the information on
partner's codeshare legs and also in the technique of using it in own revenue management
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system. Bid price sharing is the mechanism of sharing bid prices or shadow prices, which
represent the displacement costs, between the partners. It is the first step in accounting
for the partner's information in one's own system. The partner's bid prices can be used in
availability control to override the output from the optimizer and accept/reject based on
the comparison of own bid price with the difference of total fare and partner's bid price.
This is known as bid price sharing control in availability.
Though bid price sharing control accounts for the partner's opportunity cost in the
availability control step, it does not use it in the optimizer. Dynamic valuation allows the
airline to achieve that by valuing the codeshare paths dynamically depending on the
information of partner's legs.
Performance of different techniques in alliance revenue management
The different techniques related to each aspect of alliance revenue management are
tested using the simulation tool called the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator
(PODS). It is found that the revenue management in alliances becomes sup-optimal due
to incomplete information of codeshare itineraries and using an arbitrary and fixed
valuation for them in the optimizer. In an alliance, the gains with O-D control are lower
by 0.6%-0.8 % as compared to the typical gains for individual airline networks.
Under the dimension of recording & forecasting, cascading benefits marginally over AVS
in the range of 0.1% in total alliance revenue by separating the codeshare bookings from
local bookings and improving the forecast. Nonetheless, the indirect benefits of using
cascading are large since it enables the use of different techniques in the later steps of
revenue management which can yield substantial revenue gains.
Under the dimension of codeshare valuation in the optimizer, it is found that compared
to local valuation, the codeshare traffic increases significantly in the case of static total
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valuation while it goes down heavily in static Y-Prorate valuation. Since there is a
tradeoff between different traffic components in the network, the number of local and
connecting passengers goes down in total valuation while it increases in the case of Y-
Prorate valuation. None of these static valuation schemes are optimal and one can
outperform the other in terms of overall alliance revenues depending on the network
structure of the alliance partners. In the current setting of alliance network tested in
PODS, the codeshare traffic is highly valuable in terms of revenue per passenger resulting
in higher overall revenues with total valuation. Compared to local and Y-Prorate
valuation, the revenues are higher for total valuation in the range of +0.2% to +0.4%.
Under the dimension of availability control, it is observed that the two O-D control
algorithms react differently to bid price sharing control. In DAVN environment, bid price
sharing control benefits the alliance significantly, and the incremental revenue gains
compared to standard availability control lie in the range of 0.2% to 0.3%. These gains
come from an increase in the codeshare revenue component via an improved fare class
mix. This is true for local and Y-Prorate valuation schemes while total valuation benefits
only marginally using the bid price sharing control. With total valuation, the codeshare
revenues rather go down because of the higher bid prices received from partner as
compared to the local and Y-Prorate valuations.
In the ProBP environment, the incremental revenue gains from using bid price sharing
control are marginal in the range of 0.05%. This is because the rise in codeshare revenue
component is much lower in ProBP as compared to that in DAVN. The underlying
reason is that bid price sharing control uses the static valuation schemes which feed
arbitrary and fixed fare inputs to the optimizer. This results in a distortion of bid prices
in ProBP whose performance is dominated by fare inputs because it relies on the optimal
proration of itinerary fares over the traversed legs. This problem is addressed with the
new valuation scheme of dynamic valuation.
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Dynamic valuation benefits both DAVN and ProBP, with additional gains of 0.2% to
0.4% over the local and Y-Prorate valuation scheme. Though the overall revenue gains in
dynamic valuation are similar to those in total valuation scheme for this network setting,
the traffic mix is very different for the two. Total valuation overvalues the codeshare
demand and takes much more codeshare passengers than in dynamic valuation. The
benefits in dynamic valuation come from an improved fare class mix achieved across all
the traffic components. Particularly, in codeshare traffic, the total passengers carried goes
down compared to the baseline while the revenues go up significantly in both DAVN and
ProBP. The average shadow prices under dynamic valuation and bid price sharing
control are quite similar in the case of DAVN while they (bid prices) are different in
ProBP. This provides a reason for the different performances of these advanced
techniques under ProBP further leading into the exploration of underlying differences
between DAVN and ProBP.
6.2 Research Contributions
Based on the findings summarized in section 6.1, the following conclusions can be drawn
from this thesis on alliance revenue management:
oo The existence of codeshare traffic in alliances generates sub-optimality in network
revenue gains of alliance partners and the combined alliance. The magnitude of
this impact increases with the proportion of codeshare traffic carried by the
member airlines.
oo There is a tradeoff between different traffic components in alliances and every
codeshare passenger potentially replaces a local passenger or a connecting
passenger in airline's individual network.
oo Full information of codeshare itineraries booked by the partner and O-D control
for seat allocation are necessary for treating codeshare demand differently than
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local demand in the optimizer of an airline and hence optimizing the alliance
revenues.
oo Static approaches to codeshare valuation are non-optimal for alliance revenue
management. The relative performance of such schemes depends on the network
characteristics of an airline because the traffic mix could be very different under
each scheme. A particular scheme can perform better in the case of one alliance
or airline while not for the other.
oo Both bid price sharing control in availability and dynamic valuation in the
revenue management (RM) optimizer account for the information of partner's
legs using bid price sharing. Bid price sharing control uses it in the later step of
availability control without improving the codeshare valuation inputs provided to
the optimizer while dynamic valuation uses it in the optimizer itself.
oo Airlines using heuristic and more robust O-D control algorithms like DAVN can
benefit substantially by using bid price sharing control in availability. The
revenue gains are as high as those obtained with dynamic valuation in RM
optimizer.
oo Airlines using more accurate and sensitive O-D control algorithms like ProBP can
benefit substantially by using dynamic valuation in RM optimizer. Bid price
sharing control does not help because it uses a fixed codeshare valuation scheme
in RM optimizer resulting in distorted bid prices and lower revenues.
oo Dynamic valuation in RM optimizer significantly increases the codeshare revenues
for both DAVN and ProBP. It acts by improving the fare class mix, taking more
passengers in higher classes with higher yield and rejecting passengers in lower
classes. It accepts a lesser amount of codeshare traffic compared to the baseline
and total valuation scheme.
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6.3 Future Research Directions
The topic of alliance revenue management has generated tremendous interest in industry
and academia and it certainly has a large scope for future research and development. As
a follow up to this thesis, the following research directions can be explored:
Asymmetry in revenue management systems
Asymmetry in revenue management systems at different airlines in an alliance is common
in the industry. The effects of asymmetry in different dimensions of alliance revenue
management such as seat allocation optimizer and codeshare valuation can be studied.
The pertinent questions which remain unanswered are: Are there any asymmetric gains
to any one partner in the alliance by using asymmetric valuation? How are the
techniques of bid price sharing control in availability and dynamic valuation in optimizer
affected due to asymmetry? Since both techniques use partner's displacement costs, it is
important to study their performance with asymmetric systems like one partner using
DAVN and other using ProBP. Since the shadow prices for DAVN are on an average
lower than the bid prices in ProBP, scaling techniques could be used while sharing them
with partners.
Revenue sharing between partners
Sharing of revenues from codeshare bookings between alliance partners is a related
problem which needs more research. Though the results presented in this research assume
a static proration for distribution of revenues between partners (which does not affect the
combined alliance revenues), the technique of dynamic valuation provides a basis to
tackle this problem. The operating carrier of a codeshare leg must receive at least the bid
price of that leg from the marketing carrier and the revenue surplus can be further
divided in a ratio mutually agreed upon. This ratio may depend on bid prices of the
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codeshare legs involved. Different schemes can be tested for impacts on the alliance
partners.
Sharing incorrect bid prices
Another interesting area which can be looked into is testing the impact of sharing
incorrect bid prices, intentionally, during bid price sharing in order to increase one's own
share of revenues. It can potentially increase or decrease the combined alliance revenues
besides the impact on individual airline revenues. The effect will also depend on the
valuation scheme used by the airlines and more prominently on the revenue sharing
scheme. This is an area where the concepts and models from the field of game theory can
be helpful.
Testing revenue management techniques in different network settings
This thesis tests the performance of different revenue management techniques for
alliances in a single network setting in PODS which is described in Chapter 4. Other
network settings should be created which are less complex, but realistic enough, to
magnify the impacts of different techniques. Also, a different mix in terms of demand and
revenue components for the alliance carriers should be created and tested to better
understand the impacts of different valuation schemes and validate the fact that in the
current network setting, total valuation performs well just because of intelligent
aggressiveness it creates by valuing codeshares at higher values. This can be done by
changing fares for the markets under consideration. In addition, virtual codesharing may
also be tested in the new network settings.
Alliance composition and competition between alliances
The composition of alliance and competition between alliances can be studied under
different dimensions. Research on the effects of number of members in an alliance, their
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network characteristics and their different combinations can be an interesting study not
only from the point of revenue management but also from the broader view of overall
business strategy of an airline. The competition effects between alliances can be studied
as well.
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